[EM] Quick and Clean Burial Resistant Smith, compromise

[Daniel Carrera]

On Sat, Jan 8, 2022 at 5:21 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 08.01.2022 23:37, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
> > I have a hunch that if you put your "strategy-resistant Condorcet" hat
> on and
> > evaluate C//FPP, you will find it to be "good."
>
> In my Monte Carlo (non-exhaustive) simulations, there are generally
> three types of methods as far as strategy resistance goes: the type
> that's susceptible >90% of the time whatever the number of candidates,
> the type that's ~30% but increases with number of candidates to very
> high levels with lots of candidates, and the type that's low and doesn't
> increase.
>
> A method is susceptible to strategy in a particular election if the
> honest winner is A but voters who prefer some other B to A can conspire
> to get B elected by changing their ballots.
>
> C//FPP is the first type. MAM, Schulze, minmax, etc are of the second
> type, and Smith-IRV, Benham, and fpA-fpC are of the third type.
>

Wow. What type is Ranked Pairs? Is Ranked Pairs is part of the "etc"? Is
there an intuitive explanation why Smith-IRV and Benham are more resistant
to strategy? I'm trying to find Behman's method on the electowiki but I'm
not finding it. I was sure I had seen it there before. Does it have an
alternate name?

Cheers,
-- 
Dr. Daniel Carrera
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Iowa State University
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