[EM] Quick and Clean Burial Resistant Smith, compromise
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Sat Jan 8 15:20:19 PST 2022
On 08.01.2022 23:37, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> I have a hunch that if you put your "strategy-resistant Condorcet" hat on and
> evaluate C//FPP, you will find it to be "good."
In my Monte Carlo (non-exhaustive) simulations, there are generally
three types of methods as far as strategy resistance goes: the type
that's susceptible >90% of the time whatever the number of candidates,
the type that's ~30% but increases with number of candidates to very
high levels with lots of candidates, and the type that's low and doesn't
increase.
A method is susceptible to strategy in a particular election if the
honest winner is A but voters who prefer some other B to A can conspire
to get B elected by changing their ballots.
C//FPP is the first type. MAM, Schulze, minmax, etc are of the second
type, and Smith-IRV, Benham, and fpA-fpC are of the third type.
Each election is a one-shot game (first some candidate wins, then
factions get to try to make other candidates win); there's no defensive
strategy. So it probably resembles your "never looks attractive in the
first place" setting.
-km
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