[EM] So I got an email... / IIA

[robert bristow-johnson]

Forest, I have been sending a pdf of exactly that article to everyone (along with my own paper) in the great debate.  If you want, I will send you a copy.  This is what got me started in this whole Condorcet thing, even before the Burlington 2009 election.

Also, I am trying to get Eric Maskin to testify before Vermont Senate Government Operations committee.  Now he has a Nobel (he didn't in 2004).

And, I am inviting any scholars here to testify (via Zoom) if you want.  Or offer to testify (of course it's the Chair of the committee, Jeanette White, who determines which witnesses testify before the committee.)  I do not know dates yet, but it's gonna be soon.

I think, the *big* deal will be Precinct Summability.  The RCV in statewide Maine and in NYC were both a clusterfuck.  Took them more than 4 days to get a result.  Had to haul 600,000 ballots from every corner of the state to Augusta.

L8r,

r b-j

> On 04/12/2022 3:40 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> How about FairestTrue Majority Winner Ranked Choice Voting? FTMWRCV
> 
> (fight fire with fire)
> 
> It alludes to the title of the March 2004 sciam article ("The Fairest Vote of All") and its description of the CW as the "True Majority Winner."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> El mar., 12 de abr. de 2022 11:41 a. m., Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> escribió:
> > Hi Kristofer,
> >  
> >  Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de> a écrit :
> >  > Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
> >  > thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
> >  > the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
> >  > opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
> >  > perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)
> >  
> >  I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually get.
> >  It might be hard to top.
> >  
> >  To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.
> >  
> >  > As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
> >  > simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
> >  > incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.
> >  
> >  I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at least
> >  one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
> >  Plurality will have a negative score.
> >  
> >  Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent you
> >  there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could have
> >  been using a random fill strategy:
> >  
> >  0.327: D
> >  0.322: B>A>C>D
> >  0.186: A
> >  0.164: C
> >  
> >  > The reason I constructed
> >  > mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
> >  > 
> >  > E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
> >  > beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
> >  > beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
> >  > preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
> >  > lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
> >  > just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
> >  > 
> >  > Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.
> >  
> >  Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.
> >  
> >  Kevin
> > 
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--

r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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