[EM] Decloned Copeland Borda Hybrid

[Forest Simmons]

Yes ... there are several possibilities ... still exploring pros and cons
of each.

Thanks!

El vie., 8 de abr. de 2022 3:30 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at t-online.de> escribió:

> On 08.04.2022 19:15, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > Kevin,
> >
> > I'm glad you caught that. It looks like we have to go back to explícit
> > designations of anti-favorites to avoid this "accidental" lowering of B
> > on a set of ballots resulting from intentional raising of C on other
> > ballots.
> >
> > The other option would be to count truncated votes fractionally in the
> > anti-favorite tallies. But that would be messy in hand computations.
>
> There's a third option, I think, which involves counting both B and C.
>
> E.g. in my three-candidate method enumeration, the IRV scoring function is
>
> f(A) = -fpC, f(B) = -fpA, f(C) = -fpB
>
> This is nonmonotone because raising A can lower B's first preferences
> and thus increase f(C), making C win instead of A. But introducing an
> fpA term
>
> f(A) = fpA - fpC
>
> makes sure that A's score always increases when A is moved first,
> canceling out any potential improvement to C's score.
>
> Your method seems similar enough (based on last preferences rather than
> first ones) that a similar kind of fix could be employed. But perhaps
> you've already anticipated that by your description:
>
> > Elect the candidate with the greatest difference between the number of
> > ballots on which it (itself) is the designated favorite and the number
> > of ballots on which it is pairwise defeated by the designated favorite.
>
> I'm not sure, I thought I should mention it anyway :-)
>
> -km
>
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