[EM] Universal Domain

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Sun Sep 12 07:51:38 PDT 2021

On 9/12/21 3:43 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Kevin, thanks for your clarifications about Universal Domain; they 
> confirmed my worst fears ... that all of my favorite methods violate it, 
> and that it is likely impossible (as Kristofer has helped me understand) 
> to make a clone proof, monotone agenda based Banks or Landau method 
> without violating it.

I'm not entirely sure I see the implication. But assuming the worst, 
that there are no such methods, that still leaves the possibility for 
non-agenda methods.

(I do agree, though, that using implicit approval for the agenda would 
lead to a bad method; with untruncated elections, every candidate would 
be tied and the agenda would have no power at all.)

And even if you can't have all of Landau, monotonicity, and clone 
independence, River's "strongly dominated alternatives" comes quite 
close, if I recall correctly.

> Anyway if in general we are to separate the strategic burden into the 
> formation of the agenda, and have nearly complete rankings for the 
> formation of a truly faithful pairwise matrix, we either need two sets 
> of rankings, or one set  of rankings annotated by approval cutoffs, 
> ratings, or other markings not permitted by Universal Domain.

Is Random Ballot agenda any good, if we allow for some chance?


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