[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 208, Issue 23

Sun Nov 21 14:17:48 PST 2021

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From: Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com> on behalf of election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 21, 2021 1:02 PM
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Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 208, Issue 23

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Today's Topics:

   1. How Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) works
      (Richard, the VoteFair guy)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2021 11:46:51 -0800
From: "Richard, the VoteFair guy" <electionmethods at votefair.org>
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] How Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) works
Message-ID: <c2c73aa2-307d-b641-497e-432cc6172e18 at votefair.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed

Under the subject of "(no subject)" Steve Bosworth wrote:

On 11/19/2021 12:08 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
 > ... You are assured that your one
 > EPR vote of at least Acceptable will quantitatively increase
 > the voting power in the council of the elected candidate who
 > receives your ?highest possible grade?.
 >
 > When possible, your highest grade on your ballot is added to
 > the running total of that elected member. If this is not
 > possible because not enough other citizens graded that
 > candidate highly, your ballot is instead counted for the
 > elected candidate your ballot awarded its remaining
 > highest grade. If your ballot contains no such remaining
 > highest graded candidate, your proxy vote equally increases
 > the voting power of the elected candidate your highest graded
 > candidate publicly judges to be the most suitable for office.

I've added a subject because "(no subject)" is not acceptable.

Steve, you need to improve the above wording, both to allow us to give
you feedback, and because an unambiguous wording will be needed to enact
your actual intended method (and not end up with what someone else
changes the wording to become):

Here are some ambiguous concepts:

* Using the word "proxy" without saying what it means in this context.
As a guess, if your method gives unequal voting weight to the elected
council members, that needs to be explicitly stated.

* The words "graded that candidate highly" are unclear regarding HOW highly.

* The words "not enough" aren't specific.

* The words "contains no such remaining highest graded candidate" are
unclear.

* Not explaining what happens when two or more candidates are rated at
the same preference level. This might need to be a separate paragraph.

I agree there's a need for a multi-winner STV-like method that uses
rated ballots, and is better than STV.

But without being able to understand your words it's not possible to
know whether your method meets that need.

As always, I'm offering my opinion, and others might disagree.

Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy

On 11/19/2021 12:08 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
> TO: All EM contributors
>
> FROM: Steve
>
>     I agree with the recent discussions recallingthe virtues of STV.
>     However, my co-authors and I believe we have created an advance on
>     STV. It iscalled evaluative proportional representation (EPR) and we
>     would very much like EM contributors to challenge and test the
>     validity of the following claims we make for EPR.
>
>     If STV is used to elect a seven-member city council at-large, about
>     12% of all the citizens? votes cast would be wasted in the sense
>     that they did not help to elect a representative of their choice. Of
>     course, this is much better than about half of the votes being
>     wasted as is frequently the casewhen plurality at-large is being
>     use. For example, collectively the current seven members of Santa
>     Cruz Californiacitycouncil were elected by an average of about 46%
>     of all the votes cast. This means that about 54% of my fellow
>     citizens? votes were wasted, or ?diluted? in the sense meant in my
>     understanding of theCalifornia Voting Rights Act (CVRA). This is why
>     Santa Cruz is under threat of beingsued according tothis act.
>
>     However, we argue that the adoption of EPR at-large elections would
>     provide the most democratic remedy. This is because itremovessuch
>     ?dilution? as much as possible. In fact, we claim that EPR
>     guarantees that each citizen?svote will equally add to the voting
>     power of the elected candidate they see as likely to represent their
>     hopes and concerns most faithfully. This means the council will be
>     proportionally elected by all voters (100%). Each member will have a
>     different weighted vote in the council exactly equal to the number
>     of citizens? votes counted for them.
>
> _How Evaluative Proportional Representation Works:_
>
>
> Like majority judgment (MJ), EPR invites you to vote most expressively
> by grading at least one candidate?s suitability for office as either
> Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject. You can award
> the same grade to more than one candidate. You are assured that your one
> EPR vote of at least Acceptable will quantitatively increase the voting
> power in the council of the elected candidate who receives your ?highest
> possible grade?.
>
>
> When possible, your highest grade on your ballot is added to the running
> total of that elected member. If this is not possible because not enough
> other citizens graded that candidate highly, your ballot is instead
> counted for the elected candidate your ballot awarded its remaining
> highest grade. If your ballot contains no such remaining highest graded
> candidate, your proxy vote equally increases the voting power of the
> elected candidate your highest graded candidate publicly judges to be
> the most suitable for office.
>
>
> The above may be further clarified by a more detailed example of EPR?s
> four-stage count:
>
> Assume you graded the candidates on the ballot as follows: Excellent:
> both Collins and Levy; Very Good: Cosby; Good: Neuman; Acceptable: Glover
>
>
> The first rounds of _Stage 1_ of the EPR count determine to which of the
> candidates? running total of votes your Excellent is exclusively but
> provisionally added ? either Collins?s or Levy?s. It goes to the
> candidate who has the largest number of votes at that point in the count
> (ties broken by lot). This is justified by the democratic assumption
> that the candidate who has more votes is probably better.
>
>
> After counting all the ballots that award at least one candidate as
> Excellent, next are similarly counted all the remaining ballots that
> awarded Very Good as their highest grade. Similarly, the remaining
> ballots are then counted that used Good as their highest grade. Finally,
> all the remaining ballots using Acceptable as their highest grade are
> counted.
>
>
> Say your Excellent goes to Levy. Again, in _Stage 1_, your Excellent is
> added only provisionally to Levy. This is because your ballot may have
> to be transferred to another candidate by_Stage 2_ if Levy has received
> _too many votes_ of at least Acceptable, as explained next .
>
>
> To avoid the remote but anti-democratic possibility of a candidate being
> able to dictate to the council by retaining more than 50% of all the
> weighted votes in the council, our EPR algorithm does not allow a member
> to retain more than 20% of these votes. This requires at least three
> members to agree before any majority decision can be made in the council.
>
>
> Consequently, if Levy had received more than 20% in _Stage_ 1, in _Stage
> 2_ your ballot could be selected by lot as one of the surplus ballots to
> be transferred to the remaining highest graded candidate on your ballot.
> If so selected, your ballot would automatically be transferred to
> Collins (unless receiving your ballot would give her a surplus). If this
> would happen, your ballot is instead transferred under the same
> condition either to Cosby, Newman, or Glover. If none of these
> candidates are eligible, your proxy vote is finally added in _Stage 4_
> to the weighted voteof the winner publicly judged by Levy (the candidate
> you gave your highest grade)to be most fit for office. If you want, you
> may prohibit thisuse of your proxy vote by circling NO in the relevant
> box near the end of your ballot.
>
>
> At the beginning of _Stage 3_, the sevencandidatesto be elected are
> those who have accrued the largest numbers of votes by that stage. All
> the ballots currently held by candidates not elected are transferred to
> one of the winners in the same way as outlined for _Stage 2_above. As a
> result, yourvote equally adds to the weighted vote of the winner that
> finally receives yourhighest grade, remaining highest grade, or proxy
> vote ? the winner yousee as likely to represent yourhopes and concerns
> most faithfully.
>
>
> What do you think?
>
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
>

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End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 208, Issue 23
*************************************************

________________________________
From: Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com> on behalf of election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 21, 2021 1:02 PM
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 208, Issue 23

Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
        election-methods at lists.electorama.com

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        http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com

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