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<div id="divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr"><font style="font-size:11pt" face="Calibri, sans-serif" color="#000000"><b>From:</b> Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com> on behalf of election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com <election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, November 21, 2021 1:02 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> election-methods@lists.electorama.com <election-methods@lists.electorama.com><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Election-Methods Digest, Vol 208, Issue 23</font>
<div> </div>
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<div class="PlainText">Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to<br>
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Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. How Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) works<br>
(Richard, the VoteFair guy)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2021 11:46:51 -0800<br>
From: "Richard, the VoteFair guy" <electionmethods@votefair.org><br>
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br>
Subject: [EM] How Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) works<br>
Message-ID: <c2c73aa2-307d-b641-497e-432cc6172e18@votefair.org><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed<br>
<br>
Under the subject of "(no subject)" Steve Bosworth wrote:<br>
<br>
On 11/19/2021 12:08 PM, steve bosworth wrote:<br>
> ... You are assured that your one<br>
> EPR vote of at least Acceptable will quantitatively increase<br>
> the voting power in the council of the elected candidate who<br>
> receives your ?highest possible grade?.<br>
><br>
> When possible, your highest grade on your ballot is added to<br>
> the running total of that elected member. If this is not<br>
> possible because not enough other citizens graded that<br>
> candidate highly, your ballot is instead counted for the<br>
> elected candidate your ballot awarded its remaining<br>
> highest grade. If your ballot contains no such remaining<br>
> highest graded candidate, your proxy vote equally increases<br>
> the voting power of the elected candidate your highest graded<br>
> candidate publicly judges to be the most suitable for office.<br>
<br>
I've added a subject because "(no subject)" is not acceptable.<br>
<br>
Steve, you need to improve the above wording, both to allow us to give <br>
you feedback, and because an unambiguous wording will be needed to enact <br>
your actual intended method (and not end up with what someone else <br>
changes the wording to become):<br>
<br>
Here are some ambiguous concepts:<br>
<br>
* Using the word "proxy" without saying what it means in this context. <br>
As a guess, if your method gives unequal voting weight to the elected <br>
council members, that needs to be explicitly stated.<br>
<br>
* The words "graded that candidate highly" are unclear regarding HOW highly.<br>
<br>
* The words "not enough" aren't specific.<br>
<br>
* The words "contains no such remaining highest graded candidate" are <br>
unclear.<br>
<br>
* Not explaining what happens when two or more candidates are rated at <br>
the same preference level. This might need to be a separate paragraph.<br>
<br>
I agree there's a need for a multi-winner STV-like method that uses <br>
rated ballots, and is better than STV.<br>
<br>
But without being able to understand your words it's not possible to <br>
know whether your method meets that need.<br>
<br>
As always, I'm offering my opinion, and others might disagree.<br>
<br>
Richard Fobes<br>
The VoteFair guy<br>
<br>
<br>
On 11/19/2021 12:08 PM, steve bosworth wrote:<br>
> TO: All EM contributors<br>
><br>
> FROM: Steve<br>
><br>
> I agree with the recent discussions recallingthe virtues of STV.<br>
> However, my co-authors and I believe we have created an advance on<br>
> STV. It iscalled evaluative proportional representation (EPR) and we<br>
> would very much like EM contributors to challenge and test the<br>
> validity of the following claims we make for EPR.<br>
><br>
> If STV is used to elect a seven-member city council at-large, about<br>
> 12% of all the citizens? votes cast would be wasted in the sense<br>
> that they did not help to elect a representative of their choice. Of<br>
> course, this is much better than about half of the votes being<br>
> wasted as is frequently the casewhen plurality at-large is being<br>
> use. For example, collectively the current seven members of Santa<br>
> Cruz Californiacitycouncil were elected by an average of about 46%<br>
> of all the votes cast. This means that about 54% of my fellow<br>
> citizens? votes were wasted, or ?diluted? in the sense meant in my<br>
> understanding of theCalifornia Voting Rights Act (CVRA). This is why<br>
> Santa Cruz is under threat of beingsued according tothis act.<br>
><br>
> However, we argue that the adoption of EPR at-large elections would<br>
> provide the most democratic remedy. This is because itremovessuch<br>
> ?dilution? as much as possible. In fact, we claim that EPR<br>
> guarantees that each citizen?svote will equally add to the voting<br>
> power of the elected candidate they see as likely to represent their<br>
> hopes and concerns most faithfully. This means the council will be<br>
> proportionally elected by all voters (100%). Each member will have a<br>
> different weighted vote in the council exactly equal to the number<br>
> of citizens? votes counted for them.<br>
><br>
> _How Evaluative Proportional Representation Works:_<br>
><br>
><br>
> Like majority judgment (MJ), EPR invites you to vote most expressively<br>
> by grading at least one candidate?s suitability for office as either<br>
> Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject. You can award<br>
> the same grade to more than one candidate. You are assured that your one<br>
> EPR vote of at least Acceptable will quantitatively increase the voting<br>
> power in the council of the elected candidate who receives your ?highest<br>
> possible grade?.<br>
><br>
><br>
> When possible, your highest grade on your ballot is added to the running<br>
> total of that elected member. If this is not possible because not enough<br>
> other citizens graded that candidate highly, your ballot is instead<br>
> counted for the elected candidate your ballot awarded its remaining<br>
> highest grade. If your ballot contains no such remaining highest graded<br>
> candidate, your proxy vote equally increases the voting power of the<br>
> elected candidate your highest graded candidate publicly judges to be<br>
> the most suitable for office.<br>
><br>
><br>
> The above may be further clarified by a more detailed example of EPR?s<br>
> four-stage count:<br>
><br>
> Assume you graded the candidates on the ballot as follows: Excellent:<br>
> both Collins and Levy; Very Good: Cosby; Good: Neuman; Acceptable: Glover<br>
><br>
><br>
> The first rounds of _Stage 1_ of the EPR count determine to which of the<br>
> candidates? running total of votes your Excellent is exclusively but<br>
> provisionally added ? either Collins?s or Levy?s. It goes to the<br>
> candidate who has the largest number of votes at that point in the count<br>
> (ties broken by lot). This is justified by the democratic assumption<br>
> that the candidate who has more votes is probably better.<br>
><br>
><br>
> After counting all the ballots that award at least one candidate as<br>
> Excellent, next are similarly counted all the remaining ballots that<br>
> awarded Very Good as their highest grade. Similarly, the remaining<br>
> ballots are then counted that used Good as their highest grade. Finally,<br>
> all the remaining ballots using Acceptable as their highest grade are<br>
> counted.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Say your Excellent goes to Levy. Again, in _Stage 1_, your Excellent is<br>
> added only provisionally to Levy. This is because your ballot may have<br>
> to be transferred to another candidate by_Stage 2_ if Levy has received<br>
> _too many votes_ of at least Acceptable, as explained next .<br>
><br>
><br>
> To avoid the remote but anti-democratic possibility of a candidate being<br>
> able to dictate to the council by retaining more than 50% of all the<br>
> weighted votes in the council, our EPR algorithm does not allow a member<br>
> to retain more than 20% of these votes. This requires at least three<br>
> members to agree before any majority decision can be made in the council.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Consequently, if Levy had received more than 20% in _Stage_ 1, in _Stage<br>
> 2_ your ballot could be selected by lot as one of the surplus ballots to<br>
> be transferred to the remaining highest graded candidate on your ballot.<br>
> If so selected, your ballot would automatically be transferred to<br>
> Collins (unless receiving your ballot would give her a surplus). If this<br>
> would happen, your ballot is instead transferred under the same<br>
> condition either to Cosby, Newman, or Glover. If none of these<br>
> candidates are eligible, your proxy vote is finally added in _Stage 4_<br>
> to the weighted voteof the winner publicly judged by Levy (the candidate<br>
> you gave your highest grade)to be most fit for office. If you want, you<br>
> may prohibit thisuse of your proxy vote by circling NO in the relevant<br>
> box near the end of your ballot.<br>
><br>
><br>
> At the beginning of _Stage 3_, the sevencandidatesto be elected are<br>
> those who have accrued the largest numbers of votes by that stage. All<br>
> the ballots currently held by candidates not elected are transferred to<br>
> one of the winners in the same way as outlined for _Stage 2_above. As a<br>
> result, yourvote equally adds to the weighted vote of the winner that<br>
> finally receives yourhighest grade, remaining highest grade, or proxy<br>
> vote ? the winner yousee as likely to represent yourhopes and concerns<br>
> most faithfully.<br>
><br>
><br>
> What do you think?<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> ----<br>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
><br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Subject: Digest Footer<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Election-Methods mailing list<br>
Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com<br>
<a href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com">http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com</a><br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 208, Issue 23<br>
*************************************************<br>
</div>
</span></font></div>
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<div id="divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr"><font style="font-size:11pt" face="Calibri, sans-serif" color="#000000"><b>From:</b> Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com> on behalf of election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com <election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, November 21, 2021 1:02 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> election-methods@lists.electorama.com <election-methods@lists.electorama.com><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Election-Methods Digest, Vol 208, Issue 23</font>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div class="BodyFragment"><font size="2"><span style="font-size:11pt">
<div class="PlainText">Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to<br>
election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br>
<br>
To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit<br>
<a href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com">
http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com</a><br>
<br>
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to<br>
election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com<br>
<br>
You can reach the person managing the list at<br>
election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com<br>
<br>
When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific<br>
than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."<br>
<br>
<br>
Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. How Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) works<br>
(Richard, the VoteFair guy)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2021 11:46:51 -0800<br>
From: "Richard, the VoteFair guy" <electionmethods@votefair.org><br>
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br>
Subject: [EM] How Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) works<br>
Message-ID: <c2c73aa2-307d-b641-497e-432cc6172e18@votefair.org><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed<br>
<br>
Under the subject of "(no subject)" Steve Bosworth wrote:<br>
<br>
On 11/19/2021 12:08 PM, steve bosworth wrote:<br>
> ... You are assured that your one<br>
> EPR vote of at least Acceptable will quantitatively increase<br>
> the voting power in the council of the elected candidate who<br>
> receives your ?highest possible grade?.<br>
><br>
> When possible, your highest grade on your ballot is added to<br>
> the running total of that elected member. If this is not<br>
> possible because not enough other citizens graded that<br>
> candidate highly, your ballot is instead counted for the<br>
> elected candidate your ballot awarded its remaining<br>
> highest grade. If your ballot contains no such remaining<br>
> highest graded candidate, your proxy vote equally increases<br>
> the voting power of the elected candidate your highest graded<br>
> candidate publicly judges to be the most suitable for office.<br>
<br>
I've added a subject because "(no subject)" is not acceptable.<br>
<br>
Steve, you need to improve the above wording, both to allow us to give <br>
you feedback, and because an unambiguous wording will be needed to enact <br>
your actual intended method (and not end up with what someone else <br>
changes the wording to become):<br>
<br>
Here are some ambiguous concepts:<br>
<br>
* Using the word "proxy" without saying what it means in this context. <br>
As a guess, if your method gives unequal voting weight to the elected <br>
council members, that needs to be explicitly stated.<br>
<br>
* The words "graded that candidate highly" are unclear regarding HOW highly.<br>
<br>
* The words "not enough" aren't specific.<br>
<br>
* The words "contains no such remaining highest graded candidate" are <br>
unclear.<br>
<br>
* Not explaining what happens when two or more candidates are rated at <br>
the same preference level. This might need to be a separate paragraph.<br>
<br>
I agree there's a need for a multi-winner STV-like method that uses <br>
rated ballots, and is better than STV.<br>
<br>
But without being able to understand your words it's not possible to <br>
know whether your method meets that need.<br>
<br>
As always, I'm offering my opinion, and others might disagree.<br>
<br>
Richard Fobes<br>
The VoteFair guy<br>
<br>
<br>
On 11/19/2021 12:08 PM, steve bosworth wrote:<br>
> TO: All EM contributors<br>
><br>
> FROM: Steve<br>
><br>
> I agree with the recent discussions recallingthe virtues of STV.<br>
> However, my co-authors and I believe we have created an advance on<br>
> STV. It iscalled evaluative proportional representation (EPR) and we<br>
> would very much like EM contributors to challenge and test the<br>
> validity of the following claims we make for EPR.<br>
><br>
> If STV is used to elect a seven-member city council at-large, about<br>
> 12% of all the citizens? votes cast would be wasted in the sense<br>
> that they did not help to elect a representative of their choice. Of<br>
> course, this is much better than about half of the votes being<br>
> wasted as is frequently the casewhen plurality at-large is being<br>
> use. For example, collectively the current seven members of Santa<br>
> Cruz Californiacitycouncil were elected by an average of about 46%<br>
> of all the votes cast. This means that about 54% of my fellow<br>
> citizens? votes were wasted, or ?diluted? in the sense meant in my<br>
> understanding of theCalifornia Voting Rights Act (CVRA). This is why<br>
> Santa Cruz is under threat of beingsued according tothis act.<br>
><br>
> However, we argue that the adoption of EPR at-large elections would<br>
> provide the most democratic remedy. This is because itremovessuch<br>
> ?dilution? as much as possible. In fact, we claim that EPR<br>
> guarantees that each citizen?svote will equally add to the voting<br>
> power of the elected candidate they see as likely to represent their<br>
> hopes and concerns most faithfully. This means the council will be<br>
> proportionally elected by all voters (100%). Each member will have a<br>
> different weighted vote in the council exactly equal to the number<br>
> of citizens? votes counted for them.<br>
><br>
> _How Evaluative Proportional Representation Works:_<br>
><br>
><br>
> Like majority judgment (MJ), EPR invites you to vote most expressively<br>
> by grading at least one candidate?s suitability for office as either<br>
> Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject. You can award<br>
> the same grade to more than one candidate. You are assured that your one<br>
> EPR vote of at least Acceptable will quantitatively increase the voting<br>
> power in the council of the elected candidate who receives your ?highest<br>
> possible grade?.<br>
><br>
><br>
> When possible, your highest grade on your ballot is added to the running<br>
> total of that elected member. If this is not possible because not enough<br>
> other citizens graded that candidate highly, your ballot is instead<br>
> counted for the elected candidate your ballot awarded its remaining<br>
> highest grade. If your ballot contains no such remaining highest graded<br>
> candidate, your proxy vote equally increases the voting power of the<br>
> elected candidate your highest graded candidate publicly judges to be<br>
> the most suitable for office.<br>
><br>
><br>
> The above may be further clarified by a more detailed example of EPR?s<br>
> four-stage count:<br>
><br>
> Assume you graded the candidates on the ballot as follows: Excellent:<br>
> both Collins and Levy; Very Good: Cosby; Good: Neuman; Acceptable: Glover<br>
><br>
><br>
> The first rounds of _Stage 1_ of the EPR count determine to which of the<br>
> candidates? running total of votes your Excellent is exclusively but<br>
> provisionally added ? either Collins?s or Levy?s. It goes to the<br>
> candidate who has the largest number of votes at that point in the count<br>
> (ties broken by lot). This is justified by the democratic assumption<br>
> that the candidate who has more votes is probably better.<br>
><br>
><br>
> After counting all the ballots that award at least one candidate as<br>
> Excellent, next are similarly counted all the remaining ballots that<br>
> awarded Very Good as their highest grade. Similarly, the remaining<br>
> ballots are then counted that used Good as their highest grade. Finally,<br>
> all the remaining ballots using Acceptable as their highest grade are<br>
> counted.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Say your Excellent goes to Levy. Again, in _Stage 1_, your Excellent is<br>
> added only provisionally to Levy. This is because your ballot may have<br>
> to be transferred to another candidate by_Stage 2_ if Levy has received<br>
> _too many votes_ of at least Acceptable, as explained next .<br>
><br>
><br>
> To avoid the remote but anti-democratic possibility of a candidate being<br>
> able to dictate to the council by retaining more than 50% of all the<br>
> weighted votes in the council, our EPR algorithm does not allow a member<br>
> to retain more than 20% of these votes. This requires at least three<br>
> members to agree before any majority decision can be made in the council.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Consequently, if Levy had received more than 20% in _Stage_ 1, in _Stage<br>
> 2_ your ballot could be selected by lot as one of the surplus ballots to<br>
> be transferred to the remaining highest graded candidate on your ballot.<br>
> If so selected, your ballot would automatically be transferred to<br>
> Collins (unless receiving your ballot would give her a surplus). If this<br>
> would happen, your ballot is instead transferred under the same<br>
> condition either to Cosby, Newman, or Glover. If none of these<br>
> candidates are eligible, your proxy vote is finally added in _Stage 4_<br>
> to the weighted voteof the winner publicly judged by Levy (the candidate<br>
> you gave your highest grade)to be most fit for office. If you want, you<br>
> may prohibit thisuse of your proxy vote by circling NO in the relevant<br>
> box near the end of your ballot.<br>
><br>
><br>
> At the beginning of _Stage 3_, the sevencandidatesto be elected are<br>
> those who have accrued the largest numbers of votes by that stage. All<br>
> the ballots currently held by candidates not elected are transferred to<br>
> one of the winners in the same way as outlined for _Stage 2_above. As a<br>
> result, yourvote equally adds to the weighted vote of the winner that<br>
> finally receives yourhighest grade, remaining highest grade, or proxy<br>
> vote ? the winner yousee as likely to represent yourhopes and concerns<br>
> most faithfully.<br>
><br>
><br>
> What do you think?<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> ----<br>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
><br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Subject: Digest Footer<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Election-Methods mailing list<br>
Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com<br>
<a href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com">http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com</a><br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 208, Issue 23<br>
*************************************************<br>
</div>
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