[EM] Manipulation Resistant Voting
voting at ukscientists.com
Fri Jul 16 21:40:29 PDT 2021
My system, FAB STV: Four Averages Binomial STV is a statistical count, which all elections are held to be. I mean that there is no determinate election result. All elections are estimates. The more rigorous the statistical averaging of the result, the more proximate or accurate the estimate.
In other words, this view-point does not accept the premise of deterministic theorems, that there is some pre-determined right answer to who is elected.
FAB STV cannot be used strategically. No matter how one shuffles the preferences around, it cannot yield perverse results. It is monotonic.
That owes to its symmetric count for exclusions/eliminations with the election count. There is a symmetric count requirement because there is only one truth (to aspire to) in science.
That's what's wrong with MMP, it has two contradictory counts (both wrong, anyway).
The symmetric count makes a binomial count, subject to the binomial theorem, which means there are higher order counts. Tho, for most elections, the relatively simple first order count should do: one election count and one exclusion count (in reversed order of preferences).
On 17 Jul 2021, at 3:58 am, Susan Simmons <suzerainsimmons at outlook.com> wrote:
It is well known that there is no incentive for dishonest voting when the method is to elect the candidate indicated on a randomly chosen secret ballot.
Is there also a manipulation free deterministic method?
Here's one that satisfies the Condorcet Criterion when voters are rational and informed about the preferences of other voters.
The ballot is a binary decision tree with the root node at the top and the leaves marked with the names of the candidates at the bottom.
The voters mark each node to indicate their preferred decision, whether left branch or right.
A path is traced from the top to the bottom, choosing left or right at each node according to which choice is supported by by the preponderance of voters at that node.
The name marked on the leaf at the end of the path indicates the winning candidate.
When not sure, voters may copy published recommendations.
There is absolutely zero incentive to vote left at a node where you prefer the likely winner of the right branch.
So what is the catch? The catch is that it is not easy to construct a decision tree that is clone independent. Furthermore, if the tree is constructed on the basis of ballot ratings or rankings, those ballots will be subject to manipulation to secure a more favorable tree.
Is there a neutral process for constructing a clone-free decision tree?
... to be continued ...
Sent from my MetroPCS 4G LTE Android Device
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