[EM] RCV Challenge

Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
Mon Dec 27 18:30:09 PST 2021

Here's an idea for a burial resistant Condorcet efficient DSV Approval
flavored method:

Ballot B approves candidate X iff for each candidate Y that is unranked on
ballot B, candidate X both pairwise defeats Y and is ranked above Y on
ballot B.

[Pretty simple!]

Note that if X is a Condorcet candidate, then by this rule,  X will be
approved on all ballots except those on which it is unranked, and none of
those ballots will contribute any approval to any candidate.

In summary, no candidate can have more approval than the CC when there is

And the rest of this message it an effort to convince you that this method
is highly protective of sincere CC's.

Now suppose that burying the Condorcet Winner X on some ballot B puts X
into a Condorcet cycle. How will this burial affect the approval of a
typical candidate Y?

After the burial both X and any candidate Y still beaten pairwise by X will
lose the approval had before the burial.

This includes any candidate Y ranked above X before the burial.

So why would the B ballot faction want to make a move that would surely
lower approval for the set of candidates they ranked better than or equal
to X with a risky move having only a slight chance of improving some score
for some candidate they liked less than X?

I find this quite convincing .. but time will tell as we try it out on
difficult cases and random simulations.


El jue., 23 de dic. de 2021 4:08 p. m., Forest Simmons <
forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> escribió:

> Despite our best efforts, I'm not sure that we've yet seen or heard the
> best possible deterministic, Ranked Choice Voting proposals.
> In my next message I will submit the best public proposal that I can think
> of in that category (the category of Universal Domain ... i.e. based purely
> on Ranked Choice/Preference information ... equal rankings and truncations
> allowed). Of course, anybody can easily improve on any such method by
> coloring outside of the UD lines ... for example by use of explicit
> approval cutoffs, scores, grades, judgments, virtual candidates, and other
> devices for stratifying rank relations by relative importance/strength, as
> well as probabilities, random ballot drawings, etc.
> But let's temporarily put aside all of these power tools and see what we
> can accomplish with screwdriver, pliers, etc.
> The challenge is to make the method as simple as possible while complying
> with clone independence, monotonicity, and the other most basic criteria
> like Pareto, anonymity, neutrality, majority, etc.
> Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder ... hard to pin down, but you
> know it when you see it.... definitely not just a bunch of ad hoc rules
> cobbled together to patch up an out moded second rate method from
> yesteryear. The fewer seams, the better.
> Simplicity includes simplicity of data summary, simplicity of computation,
> simplicity of formulation/description, etc.
> One antonym of simplicity is complexity ... complexity of the basic
> idea/heuristic, logical complexity, computational complexity, etc.
> I look forward to seeing some of your favorite methods ... original or
> not.  And don't worry if they do not completely comply with the ideal
> criteria I outlined above ... a really good, intuitively appealing, simple
> idea can be forgiven a small transgression or two .... and could become the
> germ for an even better method.
> I put simplicity ahead of familiarity because a simple idea can easily
> become familiar, so lack of familiarity is a temporary problem caused by a
> history of poor attention to civics education.
> This challenge is an opportunity for you to take one small step to help
> remedy that educational deficiency!
> Thanks!
> -Forest
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