[EM] Test elections
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Thu Dec 2 16:11:07 PST 2021
On 11/29/21 11:38 PM, Richard Lung wrote:
>
>
> Hello Kristofer and All,
>
>
> Can't at present find reply I did make to your test elections.
>
> From memory, the nominal winner was B followed by C. But the real
> winner was A because A had almost a quota -- to half a vote -- that was
> not a statistically significant shortfall.
Thank you for running one of the test elections through FAB. For the
benefit of the list, I'll repeat the election here :-)
752: A>B>C
1750: A>C>B
1752: B>C>A
1: C>A>B
750: C>B>A
With this test election, the outcome is A>B>C for every positional
system with alpha < 0.49 (where Plurality has alpha=0 and Antiplurality
is alpha=1), B>A>C for Borda, and C>B>A for every positional system with
alpha > 0.501.
I was trying to find out if single-winner FAB could be modeled as a
positional system elimination method (the way IRV is
Plurality-elimination). If it is, it's Coombs, because if the winner is
B, and C is second place, that means A must've been eliminated first.
The test is rather crude, though, so if you have more time later I can
try more refined tests. The second test election may also provide some
information.
I agree that three-candidate single-winner elections are not very good
demonstrators of a voting method that's intended to be multiwinner - but
the elections' simplicity also makes it easier to try experiments like
these.
-km
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