[EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems (Juho Laatu)

[C.Benham]

Forest,

> These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative 
> to many applications the method must take into account preference 
> intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on 
> rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots.

Is electing the CW (based on sincere full ranking) in your view always 
the "optimal result"?

Say the sincere ratings scores are

49  A99 >   C1 >  B0
03  C99 >   A98 > B0
48  B99 >  C2 > A1

If  we don't like the idea of electing  "utility loser" CWs, why even 
collect the information telling us they exist?  I don't understand why 
the quite simple Smith//Approval(ranked above bottom) doesn't
have some traction.  Under that method these voters would presumably 
just vote:

49  A
03  C>A
48  B

A is the voted CW and the "utility winner".  No problem.

Chris Benham

On 30/01/2020 9:35 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Juho,
>
> I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your 
> point of view on this topic.
>
> Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that 
> majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among 
> the voters or from insincere voting, so that the purpose of a 
> Condorcet completion method is to find the most likely "true" social 
> preference order. It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as 
> a heuristic for coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is 
> not a solid basis in itself for choosing between methods.
>
> Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and 
> that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way.
>
> These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative 
> to many applications the method must take into account preference 
> intensities, which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on 
> rankings with approval cutoffs if not outright score ballots.
>
>
>     Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200
>     From: Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com <mailto:juho.laatu at gmail.com>>
>     To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>     <mailto:election-methods at lists.electorama.com>>
>     Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems
>     Message-ID: <3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C at gmail.com
>     <mailto:3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C at gmail.com>>
>     Content-Type: text/plain;       charset=us-ascii
>
>     My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain
>     majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to
>     me a natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering
>     and voting related (seemingly paradoxical) problems. Majorities
>     are meaningful also in cardinal voting systems since each majority
>     can win the election if they agree to do so.
>
>     BR, Juho
>
>
>
>
>
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