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<p>Forest,<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">These considerations make it clear that
for optimal results relative to many applications the method
must take into account preference intensities, which is why my
favorite methods tend to be based on rankings with approval
cutoffs if not outright score ballots.</blockquote>
<br>
Is electing the CW (based on sincere full ranking) in your view
always the "optimal result"?<br>
<br>
Say the sincere ratings scores are<br>
<br>
49 A99 > C1 > B0<br>
03 C99 > A98 > B0<br>
48 B99 > C2 > A1<br>
<br>
If we don't like the idea of electing "utility loser" CWs, why
even collect the information telling us they exist? I don't
understand why the quite simple Smith//Approval(ranked above
bottom) doesn't<br>
have some traction. Under that method these voters would
presumably just vote:<br>
<br>
49 A<br>
03 C>A<br>
48 B<br>
<br>
A is the voted CW and the "utility winner". No problem.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 30/01/2020 9:35 am, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAP29oneioRPNZeGQ6=0mRVMsG56HY-VXYdWRARGrF+SaQc=Z+Q@mail.gmail.com">
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<div>Juho,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent
with your point of view on this topic.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who
believe that majority preference cycles can only occur from
mistaken judgment among the voters or from insincere voting,
so that the purpose of a Condorcet completion method is to
find the most likely "true" social preference order. It's a
fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as a heuristic for
coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is not a
solid basis in itself for choosing between methods.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility
losers and that Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in
any rational way.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>These considerations make it clear that for optimal results
relative to many applications the method must take into
account preference intensities, which is why my favorite
methods tend to be based on rankings with approval cutoffs if
not outright score ballots.<br>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote"><br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200<br>
From: Juho Laatu <<a href="mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">juho.laatu@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: EM <<a
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting
systems<br>
Message-ID: <<a
href="mailto:3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C@gmail.com</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii<br>
<br>
My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may
contain majority cycles (even if individual opinions do
not). This is to me a natural explanation that covers most
of these social ordering and voting related (seemingly
paradoxical) problems. Majorities are meaningful also in
cardinal voting systems since each majority can win the
election if they agree to do so.<br>
<br>
BR, Juho<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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</blockquote>
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