[EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems (Juho Laatu)

[Forest Simmons]

Juho,

I always appreciate your comments, and I agree 100 percent with your point
of view on this topic.

Unfortunately there are some Condorcet enthusiasts who believe that
majority preference cycles can only occur from mistaken judgment among the
voters or from insincere voting, so that the purpose of a Condorcet
completion method is to find the most likely "true" social preference
order. It's a fairly innocuous assumption and can serve as a heuristic for
coming up with ideas for breaking cycles, but it is not a solid basis in
itself for choosing between methods.

Also falsely assumed is that the CW's cannot be utility losers and that
Condorcet Losers cannot be utility winners in any rational way.

These considerations make it clear that for optimal results relative to
many applications the method must take into account preference intensities,
which is why my favorite methods tend to be based on rankings with approval
cutoffs if not outright score ballots.


Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 22:43:35 +0200
> From: Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com>
> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems
> Message-ID: <3B8A6FF5-0AFC-498C-ABED-95A516B0B32C at gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset=us-ascii
>
> My simple explanation to myself is that group opinions may contain
> majority cycles (even if individual opinions do not). This is to me a
> natural explanation that covers most of these social ordering and voting
> related (seemingly paradoxical) problems. Majorities are meaningful also in
> cardinal voting systems since each majority can win the election if they
> agree to do so.
>
> BR, Juho
>
>
>
>
>
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