[EM] Best Single-Winner Method

[C.Benham]

Richard,

To answer my own question, I suppose you could have a bottom cycle and a 
CW who is ranked
bottom on the highest number of ballots.

That combination would be very very unlikely, but why allow it? Why not 
use my version?

Chris Benham

On 22/05/2019 3:15 pm, C.Benham wrote:
>
> Richard,
>
> Can you please explain, perhaps with an example, how your "Instant 
> Pairwise Elimination"
> method can possibly "elect a non-Condorcet winner"?
>
> As I understand it, the method eliminates all the non-members of the 
> Smith set, and then if
> more than one candidate remains, next eliminates the candidate who 
> (among remaining candidates)
> is lowest ranked on the highest number of ballots, and then repeats 
> both steps until one candidate
> remains.
>
> Is that right?
>
> From the page you linked to:
>
>> To appreciate how easy it is to understand, here’s a full description 
>> of the IPE method:
>>
>> “*Voters rank the candidates using as many ranking levels as there 
>> are candidates, or at least 5 ranking levels if ovals are marked on a 
>> paper ballot and space is limited and lots of the candidates are 
>> unlikely to win. During counting, each elimination round eliminates 
>> the candidate who loses every pairwise contest against every other 
>> remaining candidate. If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing 
>> candidate then, for that round, each ballot gives one count to the 
>> lowest-ranked remaining candidate on that ballot, and the candidate 
>> with the highest such count is eliminated. The last remaining 
>> candidate wins.*”
>>
>
> Chris Benham
>
> On 22/05/2019 5:13 am, VoteFair wrote:
>> On 5/20/2019 12:46 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>>> Re: Best Single- Winner Method
>>> ...
>>> Firstly, please correct me if I am mistaken but currently I am assuming
>>> that  we all would ideally want the Best Single-Winner Method:
>>>
>>>  1. To be simple enough so voters  can both use it and understand 
>>> how it
>>>     is counted;
>>>  2. To minimize the wasting of citizens’ votes (see below), and
>>>  3. To guarantee that the winner among 3 or more candidates is the
>>>     candidate most supported by at least 50% plus one (an absolute
>>>     majority) of all the citizens voting, and
>>>  4. To offer as few incentives and possibilities for voting tactical.
>>
>> I suggest that Instant Pairwise Elimination provides a great balance 
>> among these requirements.
>>
>> 1: It's simple to use, and simple to understand how to count.
>>
>> 2: Rarely could a voter identify a situation where their vote was 
>> wasted.
>>
>> 3: It's not a Condorcet method, yet it would be very rare for it to 
>> elect a non-Condorcet winner.
>>
>> 4: Tactical voting is possible, but only when a rock-paper-scissors 
>> cycle is involved AND involves the most popular candidates.
>>
>> As a reminder of Instant Pairwise Elimination, it's described here:
>>
>> https://democracychronicles.org/instant-pairwise-elimination/
>>
>> Richard Fobes
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