[EM] Best-Single Method-MJ

[steve bosworth]

Hi Toby,

I will respond below inline.

Steve
Message: 3
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 14:31:17 +0000 (UTC)
From: Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>
To: EM List <election-methods at electorama.com>
Subject: [EM] What should an ideal single-winner method achieve?
Message-ID: <2093644385.1380055.1561645877622 at mail.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

T:  With all the discussion of different single-winner methods and the criteria they pass and fail, I'm interested to know what you think the "ideal" method should hope to achieve. For example, some people might want to maximise utility summed across the voters.

S:  Please help me by defining what you mean by  *utility” and explain exactly how it should be *summed*.

T:  Others might want to find the candidate that is closest to the "median voter".

S:  By *median voter*, do you mean something other than MJ’s winner who has received at least 50% plus one of the grades from all the voters which are equal to or higher than the highest median-grade received by any of the candidates?

T:  For others it might be more about obeying some sort of majority criterion (e.g. Condorcet). Etc.

S: If you require the winner to be supported by the above *majority*, no Condorcet method guarantees that such a winner will be found.  Unlike any other method, MJ does guarantee this.

T: Personally, the measure that makes most sense to me is to maximise utility….

S:  This is what MJ seems to do by electing the candidate judge to be the candidate most fit for office, i.e. the  one most able and likely to help to maximise the utility of society.  This is indicated by the highest median-grade that that winner received from this electorate.

T:  …. But this doesn't automatically mean score voting (where a score could simply be seen as a utility rating of a candidate), at least in part because strategies that voters adopt might reduce its effectiveness.

S:  This is only one of the flaws inherent in score.

T:  Obviously, a voting method also needs to be simple enough to understand (in terms of voting and understanding how the winner is calculated), and it might be that different types of election suit different methods.

S:  MJ finds the winner simply by comparing the median-grades of each candidate.  Also, more clearly than its alternatives, MJ allows each voter most fully to express their judgment of each candidate (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject),  These qualities seem to make MJ the method most suited to elect any single-winner.  What do you think?  Please explain any flaws you see in MJ.

Toby

Steve


________________________________

Message: 3
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 14:31:17 +0000 (UTC)
From: Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>
To: EM List <election-methods at electorama.com>
Subject: [EM] What should an ideal single-winner method achieve?
Message-ID: <2093644385.1380055.1561645877622 at mail.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

With all the discussion of different single-winner methods and the criteria they pass and fail, I'm interested to know what you think the "ideal" method should hope to achieve. For example, some people might want to maximise utility summed across the voters. Others might want to find the candidate that is closest to the "median voter". For others it might be more about obeying some sort of majority criterion (e.g. Condorcet). Etc.
Personally, the measure that makes most sense to me is to maximise utility. But this doesn't automatically mean score voting (where a score could simply be seen as a utility rating of a candidate), at least in part because strategies that voters adopt might reduce its effectiveness. Obviously a voting method also needs to be simple enough to understand (in terms of voting and understanding how the winner is calculated), and it might be that different types of election suit different methods.
Toby
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