[EM] High Resolution Inferred Approval version of ASM

Richard Lung voting at ukscientists.com
Mon Jun 24 17:08:25 PDT 2019

Borda method, I take to be just the archetype of points systems.
Typically, I am talking about all those systems that assign or allow 
some count of the vote to the voters, instead of allowing the count to 
come from counting the votes. These systems tend to treat the voters 
like their own returning officers. VIASME appears to be a case in point. 
I don't see its decisive difference in principle from the score voting 
A noticable tendency, I put it no stronger than that, of points systems 
or score voting is to promote single stage counts, without appreciating 
that their primitive example, simple plurality (FPTP) is just an 
abandoned count, after one stage of election.

As to Condorcet pairing, it discards the information of the over-all 
ranking of the candidates. This is the stock criticism first made by 
Laplace, in favor of Borda. But since the count in stages, of JB 
Gregory, we don't need to assume the relative weight of support for a 
range of candidates, so far as surplus transfer of votes is concerned. 
(FAB STV introduces real relative weighting of preference for 
quota-deficit as well as surplus voted candidates.)

Richard L.

On 24/06/2019 20:29, C.Benham wrote:
> Richard L,
> You didn't exactly answer my question (What is your working definition 
> of a "points system"?).
> I infer from what you write that you are talking about methods that 
> use ranking ballots and just award points according
> to some predetermined fixed schedule of so many points for being 
> ranked first and so many for being ranked second and
> so on and then just elects the candidate with highest (or as with one 
> version of Borda I've heard of, the lowest) total score.
> Why do you think that is relevant to my suggested VIASME method?  To 
> refresh your memory:
>> This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses high-intensity Score 
>> ballots (say 0-100):
>> *Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with many 
>> more available distinct scores
>> (or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is zero.
>> 1. Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise beats-all 
>> candidate that candidate wins.
>> 2. Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each ballot as 
>> showing approval for the
>> candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it gives.
>> Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and 
>> eliminate the lowest-ordered
>> candidate.
>> 3. Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated candidates, repeat 
>> steps 1 and 2 until
>> there is a winner.*
>> To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members of the 
>> Smith set and stop when
>> we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the 
>> highest-ordered one.
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins
>> In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted 
>> Margins where the voters signal
>> their approval cut-offs  just by having a large gap in the scores 
>> they give.
> It could be that you have misunderstood what I mean by "high intensity 
> Score ballots". It has nothing to
> do with anything Borda-like.  The voter assign however many points to 
> each candidate that they wish.
> In the US, "Score Voting" (formerly and also called "Range Voting") is 
> a version of Average Ratings where
> the voters give candidates any score they like in the 0-99 inclusive 
> range.
> Actually since in VIASME the scores are only used to infer ranking and 
> sometimes approval, the individual voters
> can in theory use any range of scores they like.
> Chris Benham
> On 25/06/2019 4:09 am, Richard Lung wrote:
>> Thankyou for asking.
>> It's standard statistics. I refered to it occasionally over the years.
>> To give a more representative summary of classes of data, they may be 
>> weighted. If no accurate information is available, the weights to 
>> respective classes may be assumed. Hence Borda method fits the 
>> statistical description, weighting in arithmetic progression. JFS 
>> Ross, Elections and Electors, 1955, suggested that the weighting 
>> would be more realistic using the geometric mean. This would be 
>> weighting in geometric progression. The British broadcaster Robin Day 
>> favored weighting in harmonic progression!
>> But the point is they are all assumptions. This is the basic drawback 
>> to score voting systems.
>> The other standard statistical phrase is weighting in arithmetic 
>> proportion, which applies when statisticians have the weighting data 
>> for the proportionate importance of the classes of data. An example 
>> of this well-defined count is the Gregory weighting of the total 
>> transferable vote or alternatively, and more consistently, the Meek 
>> method keep values.
>> Of course, this accurate count does not apply to deficit votes, as 
>> well as surplus votes for candidates. That is, until FAB STV.
>> By the way, as far as method of counting is concerned, FAB STV is 
>> unlike traditional STV in that it does not distinguish between AV and 
>> STV, because only the latter is PR with potential surplus transfers. 
>> Consequently, there is no special "single winner method" with FAB STV.
>> But there is a but, which, without going into details, essentially is 
>> JS Mill distinction between democracy and maiorocracy.
>> Richard L.
>> On 24/06/2019 15:58, Chris Benham wrote:
>>> Richard L,
>>> Can you please expand a bit on the meaning and relevance of your 
>>> profound observation?
>>> What is your working definition of a "points system"? (I can perhaps 
>>> guess from your reference to the Borda method.)
>>> How is your reference to some variants of the multi-winner? Single 
>>> Transferable Vote algorithm relevant to the discussion of a 
>>> single-winner method?
>>> Chris Benham
>>> On 23/06/2019 11:54 pm, Richard Lung wrote:
>>>> Points systems (Borda method is the archetype) are an assumed 
>>>> weighting of preferences. Gregory method transfer value or Meek 
>>>> method keep values are a real weighting of preferences.
>>>> Richard L.
>>>> On 20/06/2019 21:03, Forest Simmons wrote:
>>>>> Chris, I like it especially the part about naive voters voting 
>>>>> sincerely being at no appreciable disadvantage while resisting 
>>>>> burial and complying with the CD criterion.
>>>>> From your experience in Australia where full rankings are required 
>>>>> (as I understand it) what do you think about the practicality of 
>>>>> rating on a scale of zero to 99, as compared with ranking a long 
>>>>> list of candidates? Is it a big obstacle?
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