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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Borda method, I take to be just the
archetype of points systems. <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Typically, I am talking about all those
systems that assign or allow some count of the vote to the voters,
instead of allowing the count to come from counting the votes.
These systems tend to treat the voters like their own returning
officers. VIASME appears to be a case in point. I don't see its
decisive difference in principle from the score voting family.)<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">A noticable tendency, I put it no
stronger than that, of points systems or score voting is to
promote single stage counts, without appreciating that their
primitive example, simple plurality (FPTP) is just an abandoned
count, after one stage of election.<br>
</div>
<p>As to Condorcet pairing, it discards the information of the
over-all ranking of the candidates. This is the stock criticism
first made by Laplace, in favor of Borda. But since the count in
stages, of JB Gregory, we don't need to assume the relative weight
of support for a range of candidates, so far as surplus transfer
of votes is concerned. (FAB STV introduces real relative weighting
of preference for quota-deficit as well as surplus voted
candidates.)</p>
<p>Richard L.<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 24/06/2019 20:29, C.Benham wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:8cdcd3c8-3d83-60c1-8a98-40083683a12a@adam.com.au">
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<p>Richard L,<br>
<br>
You didn't exactly answer my question (What is your working
definition of a "points system"?).<br>
I infer from what you write that you are talking about methods
that use ranking ballots and just award points according<br>
to some predetermined fixed schedule of so many points for being
ranked first and so many for being ranked second and<br>
so on and then just elects the candidate with highest (or as
with one version of Borda I've heard of, the lowest) total
score.<br>
<br>
Why do you think that is relevant to my suggested VIASME
method? To refresh your memory:<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p>This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses
high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100):<br>
<br>
*Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with
many more available distinct scores<br>
(or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is
zero.<br>
<br>
1. Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise
beats-all candidate that candidate wins.<br>
<br>
2. Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each
ballot as showing approval for the<br>
candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it
gives.<br>
Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and
eliminate the lowest-ordered<br>
candidate.<br>
</p>
<p>3. Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated
candidates, repeat steps 1 and 2 until <br>
there is a winner.*<br>
<br>
To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members
of the Smith set and stop when<br>
we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the
highest-ordered one.<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins</a><br>
</p>
In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted
Margins where the voters signal<br>
their approval cut-offs just by having a large gap in the
scores they give.</blockquote>
<br>
It could be that you have misunderstood what I mean by "high
intensity Score ballots". It has nothing to <br>
do with anything Borda-like. The voter assign however many points
to each candidate that they wish.<br>
<br>
In the US, "Score Voting" (formerly and also called "Range
Voting") is a version of Average Ratings where<br>
the voters give candidates any score they like in the 0-99
inclusive range. <br>
<br>
Actually since in VIASME the scores are only used to infer ranking
and sometimes approval, the individual voters <br>
can in theory use any range of scores they like. <br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 25/06/2019 4:09 am, Richard Lung
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:b6855d6d-7e86-6f32-d5d2-58117856b5d3@ukscientists.com">
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Thankyou for asking.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">It's standard statistics. I refered
to it occasionally over the years. <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">To give a more representative
summary of classes of data, they may be weighted. If no
accurate information is available, the weights to respective
classes may be assumed. Hence Borda method fits the
statistical description, weighting in arithmetic progression.
JFS Ross, Elections and Electors, 1955, suggested that the
weighting would be more realistic using the geometric mean.
This would be weighting in geometric progression. The British
broadcaster Robin Day favored weighting in harmonic
progression! <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">But the point is they are all
assumptions. This is the basic drawback to score voting
systems.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">The other standard statistical
phrase is weighting in arithmetic proportion, which applies
when statisticians have the weighting data for the
proportionate importance of the classes of data. An example of
this well-defined count is the Gregory weighting of the total
transferable vote or alternatively, and more consistently, the
Meek method keep values. <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Of course, this accurate count does
not apply to deficit votes, as well as surplus votes for
candidates. That is, until FAB STV.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">By the way, as far as method of
counting is concerned, FAB STV is unlike traditional STV in
that it does not distinguish between AV and STV, because only
the latter is PR with potential surplus transfers.
Consequently, there is no special "single winner method" with
FAB STV. <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">But there is a but, which, without
going into details, essentially is JS Mill distinction between
democracy and maiorocracy.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Richard L.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 24/06/2019 15:58, Chris Benham
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:7ef3bf09-96b1-b695-0b70-a12ce7966195@yahoo.com.au">
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<p>Richard L,<br>
<br>
Can you please expand a bit on the meaning and relevance of
your profound observation?<br>
<br>
What is your working definition of a "points system"? (I can
perhaps guess from your reference to the Borda method.)<br>
<br>
How is your reference to some variants of the multi-winner?
Single Transferable Vote algorithm relevant to the
discussion of a single-winner method?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 23/06/2019 11:54 pm, Richard
Lung wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:8d4967a0-62af-e27a-f389-6cd6a7d2c08e@ukscientists.com">
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Points systems (Borda method is
the archetype) are an assumed weighting of preferences.
Gregory method transfer value or Meek method keep values
are a real weighting of preferences.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Richard L.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 20/06/2019 21:03, Forest
Simmons wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAP29oncPN-XO-U=5UqaeR4h8-bgOqYHL=exBcoZx9nmGVUzSWg@mail.gmail.com">
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<div dir="ltr">
<div>Chris, I like it especially the part about naive
voters voting sincerely being at no appreciable
disadvantage while resisting burial and complying with
the CD criterion. <br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>From your experience in Australia where full
rankings are required (as I understand it) what do you
think about the practicality of rating on a scale of
zero to 99, as compared with ranking a long list of
candidates? Is it a big obstacle?<br>
</div>
</div>
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