[EM] Fwd: What are some simple methods that accomplish the following conditions?
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Sat Jun 1 12:23:01 PDT 2019
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
Date: Sat, Jun 1, 2019 at 12:01 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] What are some simple methods that accomplish the
To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
Great! This is the kind of creativity that will continue to keep this EM
list alive and relevant.
On Sat, Jun 1, 2019 at 8:13 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> On 31/05/2019 00.33, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > In the example profiles below 100 = P+Q+R, and 50>P>Q>R>0. One
> > consequence of these constraints is that in all three profiles below the
> > cycle A>B>C>A will obtain.
> > I am interested in simple methods that always ...
> > (1) elect candidate A given the following profile:
> You might be able to do something with my (three-candidate) fpA-fpC
> method, since it elects A in the situation where:
> P: A
> Q: B>C
> R: C
> since you have an ABCA cycle. In a 3-cycle, fpA-fpC lets each
> candidate's score be the number of first preferences for that candidate,
> minus the number of first preferences for whoever beats him pairwise.
> Highest score wins. Thus the scores become:
> A: fpA - fpC = P - R
> B: fpB - fpA = Q - P
> C: fpC - fpB = R - Q
> Since P > Q > R, P - R > 0, but Q-P and R-Q < 0, so A wins.
> Extending this method to four candidates so it meets Smith and still
> both resists strategy and passes mono-raise is hard, and is one of the
> things I'm working on (on and off) at the moment.
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