[EM] Losing Votes (equal-ranking whole)

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Jun 1 07:55:28 PDT 2019

Hi Jim,

You list good considerations. Two comments:
1. The Plurality criterion doesn't actually demand that A defeat B. A's first preferences only disqualify
D. (But Majority Favorite demands an A win.)
2. I would ask what are the strategic implications. If B wins because the 51 ranked B above the two
"irrelevant alternatives" then either you need A voters to be OK with losing like that, or you have to
suppose that voters may try to rank their lesser compromise choices beneath irrelevant alternatives
to avoid an unnecessary loss. We may even be seeing this tactic in the B votes below, if this in fact
is a win for B.


>Le samedi 1 juin 2019 à 07:15:33 UTC−5, Faran, James <jjfaran at buffalo.edu> a écrit : 
>51 A>B>C>D 
>49 B>C>D>A
>Is A a better choice than B?
>1. Yes. Plurality demands it. Moreover, B beats C and D on all ballots, so C and D can be ignored 
>and the pairwise race is all that's left.
>2. No. A is ranked bottom on 49% of ballots, B ranked at least second on 100%, top on almost half.
>Are C and D Irrelevant Alternatives?
>Jim Faran

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