[EM] IRV et al v. EPR

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Mon Jul 16 14:14:50 PDT 2018

People should be aware of Delegable Proxy, which can create full 
representation. There have been proposals for assemblies with variable 
voting power, i.e., where those elected to the Assembly cast as many 
votes as they received in the election.

However, I prefer to move toward full democracy along this path.

First of all, propose and implement simple Asset Voting in NGOs, where 
experience with it can be gained.

Then, as it becomes known that what Asset can do is possible, it can be 
proposed for public elections. The rest of this is a plan for an NGO:

1. Use simple asset (vote for one!) with the Hare quota ((i.e., votes/seats)

2. Anyone may register to become an elector. If there are eligible 
persons not registered, they may not receive votes in the election, but 
may then allow themselves to be chosen for further participation. One of 
the Asset strengths is that it can elect candidates who did not receive 
any votes in the secret ballot election.\

3. Outside of Questions of Privilege, or related motions (such as 
Adjourn) the vote required for any measure to pass is a majority of the 
number of seats as was used to define the quota. Seats, then, will 
always maximize their own power by cooperating to create the maximum 
number of seats. It may be normal for a seat to be vacant, or even 
possibly more than one. Electors may still function to represent the 
voters until the next election.

4. Having created a fully representative assembly, it is possible to 
allow certain kinds of voting directly by electors. It is not necessary 
to specify the rules for this at this point, but the basic concept would 
be that to make procedural motions and vote on them, one must have a 
seat. But measures with lasting effect could be open for internet voting 
by electors. If an elector does not vote, the seat's vote counts as full 
strength, one full vote (or it could be reported and used as the quota 
of votes). If an elector does vote, then the seat's vote is devalued by 
the number of votes the elector contributed to the seats that are 
normally serving. This is trivial to do with computers, and would all be 
open, visible. This could become important where seats are put together 
with heavy compromise, from the "dregs," i.e., smaller amounts of 
leftover votes not already assigned.

My guess is that direct voting would only be rarely used. It's too much 
work to pay attention to the process, except for a few electors, I 
suspect, and for a few questions of particular importance for them. 
Rather, what I suspect is that voters, and electors especially as public 
voters, would focus on finding truly qualifed people to represent them, 
people who, if the elector disagrees with them on an issue, might be 
inclined to trust the one they chose. After all, they are likely to be 
more informed!

Most discussion of voting systems pay little attention to what might be 
called collective intelligence, how to enhance it.

My opinion is that any organization that creates a deliberative body 
based on Asset will be more likely to prosper. Asset is designed to 
foster cooperation, not conflict. It will not magically create it, but 
it simply gets rid of the necessity for oppositional campaigning.

On 7/16/2018 3:21 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Most of those multiwinner methods have unweighted winners. In EPR (as 
> I understand it), each winner has a different weight in the assembly, 
> and thus instead of discarding just a quota and then redistributing 
> the surplus, it's possible to assign more than a quota to a single 
> winner, who benefits from this "supermajority" by an increased weight.

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