[EM] IRV et al v. EPR
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Mon Jul 16 14:14:50 PDT 2018
People should be aware of Delegable Proxy, which can create full
representation. There have been proposals for assemblies with variable
voting power, i.e., where those elected to the Assembly cast as many
votes as they received in the election.
However, I prefer to move toward full democracy along this path.
First of all, propose and implement simple Asset Voting in NGOs, where
experience with it can be gained.
Then, as it becomes known that what Asset can do is possible, it can be
proposed for public elections. The rest of this is a plan for an NGO:
1. Use simple asset (vote for one!) with the Hare quota ((i.e., votes/seats)
2. Anyone may register to become an elector. If there are eligible
persons not registered, they may not receive votes in the election, but
may then allow themselves to be chosen for further participation. One of
the Asset strengths is that it can elect candidates who did not receive
any votes in the secret ballot election.\
3. Outside of Questions of Privilege, or related motions (such as
Adjourn) the vote required for any measure to pass is a majority of the
number of seats as was used to define the quota. Seats, then, will
always maximize their own power by cooperating to create the maximum
number of seats. It may be normal for a seat to be vacant, or even
possibly more than one. Electors may still function to represent the
voters until the next election.
4. Having created a fully representative assembly, it is possible to
allow certain kinds of voting directly by electors. It is not necessary
to specify the rules for this at this point, but the basic concept would
be that to make procedural motions and vote on them, one must have a
seat. But measures with lasting effect could be open for internet voting
by electors. If an elector does not vote, the seat's vote counts as full
strength, one full vote (or it could be reported and used as the quota
of votes). If an elector does vote, then the seat's vote is devalued by
the number of votes the elector contributed to the seats that are
normally serving. This is trivial to do with computers, and would all be
open, visible. This could become important where seats are put together
with heavy compromise, from the "dregs," i.e., smaller amounts of
leftover votes not already assigned.
My guess is that direct voting would only be rarely used. It's too much
work to pay attention to the process, except for a few electors, I
suspect, and for a few questions of particular importance for them.
Rather, what I suspect is that voters, and electors especially as public
voters, would focus on finding truly qualifed people to represent them,
people who, if the elector disagrees with them on an issue, might be
inclined to trust the one they chose. After all, they are likely to be
Most discussion of voting systems pay little attention to what might be
called collective intelligence, how to enhance it.
My opinion is that any organization that creates a deliberative body
based on Asset will be more likely to prosper. Asset is designed to
foster cooperation, not conflict. It will not magically create it, but
it simply gets rid of the necessity for oppositional campaigning.
On 7/16/2018 3:21 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Most of those multiwinner methods have unweighted winners. In EPR (as
> I understand it), each winner has a different weight in the assembly,
> and thus instead of discarding just a quota and then redistributing
> the surplus, it's possible to assign more than a quota to a single
> winner, who benefits from this "supermajority" by an increased weight.
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