[EM] Voting without ballots (was: Minimax)

[Andy Jennings]

I like this idea, Juho.  If there is an incumbent, put all the challengers
on one approval ballot and ask "Which ones do you like better than the
incumbent?"  It is a nice solution to the what-does-approval-mean problem.

Like you said, the threshold doesn't have to be 50%, either.  It could go
down, in a gradual sort-of term limit.  After one term, the mayor will
remain if no challenger gets over 60%.  After two terms, it's 50%.  After
three terms, it's 40%.  After four terms, it's 30%.

In the past, I haven't been sure what to do if there is no incumbent.
Letting the incumbent pick a successor is an interesting solution.  As is
letting the largest opposition party choose someone (if the election is
partisan).

Andy

On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 11:30 PM, Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:

> That method could be said to be problematic since it is not symmetric. But
> on the other hand it could be an excellent method for many elections where
> we the asymmetry has some explanation.
>
> If we have an incumbent president that we might or might not change, that
> president could be the default option. In addition to voting on who is the
> best candidate, we would be voting also on whether to change the president
> or not. If the current president is no longer a candidate, he could
> nominate a proposed successor who would be the default option. Or in a
> two-party system one could pick the (first) candidate of the opposition
> party as the default option, since that's the way things tend to go anyway
> (at least after the current president has run out of allowed terms). Or
> maybe a parliament or other central but wider group would pick the default
> option. The default option should not be a weak option but one that is a
> plausible winner (the current president should thus nominate a candidate of
> some other party as the default option if it is obvious that he is
> currently popular).
>
> This method would allow also having a threshold that would be required to
> not elect the incumbent or default option.
>
> This method is a nice way to solve the problem of cyclic group preferences
> if one can use time to distribute the victory to multiple candidates. If
> there is a permanent top cycle A>B>C>A, C would win A, B would win C in the
> next election after maybe a year etc. No need to "break" the cycle since
> time will (maybe) allow all the cyclic candidates to participate. They just
> need to wait for their turn. (Not allowing the Minmax winner outside of the
> top cycle to win could be considered a disadvantage of this method.)
>
> The ballot could be simply an approval ballot, asking "which options do
> you prefer to the default option". This method could thus be seen also as
> an improved Approval method. Adding a (strong) default option to Approval
> makes it more sensible than it is without that default option.
>
> This approach could offer also a smooth path away from Plurality.
>
> Juho
>
>
> On 12 May 2017, at 02:48, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
>
> I think this is an interesting topic... Basically how to make a decision
> in a meeting when you don't have ballots and people aren't inclined to talk
> to each other. There's probably a whole field on this topic and I'm just
> not aware of it...
>
> My idea here would be one I've mentioned before (but as an election
> method), that somehow a default option is initially selected, and then this
> option wins unless a full majority thinks another option is better. The
> largest such majority would immediately win in that situation; we would not
> chase around any cycles. So, there is both an advantage and disadvantage to
> being the default option. The advantage is obvious. The disadvantage is
> that the default option could lose when, had it not been the default, it
> could have won.
>
> To rephrase a bit, I'm saying that for candidates A...Z where A is the
> default option, you only collect the votes for B...Z against A. Nobody's
> voting A over anything.
>
> By not collecting the other pairwise information you might hopefully
> reduce the potential to make arguments against the winner's legitimacy. (A
> bit like the difficulty of undermining the winner under FPP or Approval,
> when the only sure data available is the counts that produced the winner.)
>
> You could pick the default option using an election method (and even have
> an instant-win criterion if one is sensible). The mechanism does not
> enforce Plurality, only minimal defense.
>
> Sorry for lack of other responses. I can't find enough time to write.
>
> Kevin
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *De :* Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com>
> *À :* Election Methods <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> *Cc :* Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
> *Envoyé le :* Dimanche 7 mai 2017 5h32
> *Objet :* Re: [EM] Ordering defeats in Minimax
>
> > On 07 May 2017, at 12:39, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> wrote:
> >
> > On 05/07/2017 10:58 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> >>> On 06 May 2017, at 23:26, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr
> >>> <mailto:stepjak at yahoo.fr>> wrote:
> >
> >>> Legislators usually don't use election
> >>> methods. I would say essentially they figure out among themselves what
> >>> the outcome likely must be and then "elect" it, typically by a majority
> >>> vote. If voters could do that directly I think that would be the ideal
> >>> situation, as far as minimizing the need for strategy.
> >>
> >> That's an interesting viewpoint. I'd like to see Condorcet tested in
> >> some parliaments. Although negotiations and Plurality can be used to
> >> solve many cases, also Condorcet and the idea of having multiple
> >> candidates could have some benefits. The first one in my mind is
> >> openness. Even when the "big boys" have agreed something behind the
> >> screens, and then bring that decision into a majority vote, some smaller
> >> groupings could add some alternatives in the election that they consider
> >> better. This would open up the available alternatives to the world
> >> (media, public), and all voters would have to take position on the
> >> presented alternatives. Small parties or groupings could thus make
> >> sensible compromise proposals that might even win, if they are good
> enough.
> >
> > I think some parliaments use the following procedure for multiple
> proposals or amendments:
> >
> > Some group decides the agenda (I'm not sure who; it probably depends on
> the parliament in question).
> >
> > Then the parliament discusses the first two options, and does a majority
> vote between the two. It then does a majority vote between the winner so
> far and the next option, and so on until all options have been considered.
> The winner at the end of the procedure is the option that is accepted.
> >
> > This method is Condorcet (because the CW beats everybody pairwise, and
> so whenever it becomes the winner so far, it'll stay the winner so far; and
> whenever it's the challenger, it will win against the winner so far and
> become the next winner so far). Furthermore, it's Smith. How cycles are
> broken depends on the agenda.
>
> Yes, this is some sort of "serial Condorcet".  The biggest problem of this
> approach is probably the agenda based cycle breaking that you mentioned.
>
> If there is a Condorcet winner, it will win. But if there is any chance of
> having a cycle, then the chairman (if he decides the agenda) may arrange
> the agenda so that his favourite option is the last one in the queue of
> options. With three candidates this already determines the order of all
> pairwise votes.
>
> With three candidates the cycle could be either A>B>C>A or A>C>B>A. The
> chairman wants A to win. The first vote will therefore be between B and C.
> If we have cycle A>B>C>A, B will win the first round, and A will win the
> second round (against B).  If we have cycle A>C>B>A, C will win the first
> round, and A will win the second round (against C). The chairman could thus
> pick the preferred winner in the case that there is no Condorcet winner.
>
> The voters could also try to use some strategies. This gives us some quite
> interesting strategy patterns, since after the agenda has been set, the
> method is no more symmetric with respect to the different options. A and B
> supporters could also join forces and vote against A at the last round, if
> they don't like the chairmans idea of constructing a strategic agenda.
>
>
> Juho
>
>
>
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