[EM] Voting without ballots (was: Minimax)

Thu May 11 23:30:23 PDT 2017

That method could be said to be problematic since it is not symmetric. But on the other hand it could be an excellent method for many elections where we the asymmetry has some explanation.

If we have an incumbent president that we might or might not change, that president could be the default option. In addition to voting on who is the best candidate, we would be voting also on whether to change the president or not. If the current president is no longer a candidate, he could nominate a proposed successor who would be the default option. Or in a two-party system one could pick the (first) candidate of the opposition party as the default option, since that's the way things tend to go anyway (at least after the current president has run out of allowed terms). Or maybe a parliament or other central but wider group would pick the default option. The default option should not be a weak option but one that is a plausible winner (the current president should thus nominate a candidate of some other party as the default option if it is obvious that he is currently popular).

This method would allow also having a threshold that would be required to not elect the incumbent or default option.

This method is a nice way to solve the problem of cyclic group preferences if one can use time to distribute the victory to multiple candidates. If there is a permanent top cycle A>B>C>A, C would win A, B would win C in the next election after maybe a year etc. No need to "break" the cycle since time will (maybe) allow all the cyclic candidates to participate. They just need to wait for their turn. (Not allowing the Minmax winner outside of the top cycle to win could be considered a disadvantage of this method.)

The ballot could be simply an approval ballot, asking "which options do you prefer to the default option". This method could thus be seen also as an improved Approval method. Adding a (strong) default option to Approval makes it more sensible than it is without that default option.

This approach could offer also a smooth path away from Plurality.

Juho

> On 12 May 2017, at 02:48, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> 
> I think this is an interesting topic... Basically how to make a decision in a meeting when you don't have ballots and people aren't inclined to talk to each other. There's probably a whole field on this topic and I'm just not aware of it...
> 
> My idea here would be one I've mentioned before (but as an election method), that somehow a default option is initially selected, and then this option wins unless a full majority thinks another option is better. The largest such majority would immediately win in that situation; we would not chase around any cycles. So, there is both an advantage and disadvantage to being the default option. The advantage is obvious. The disadvantage is that the default option could lose when, had it not been the default, it could have won.
> 
> To rephrase a bit, I'm saying that for candidates A...Z where A is the default option, you only collect the votes for B...Z against A. Nobody's voting A over anything.
> 
> By not collecting the other pairwise information you might hopefully reduce the potential to make arguments against the winner's legitimacy. (A bit like the difficulty of undermining the winner under FPP or Approval, when the only sure data available is the counts that produced the winner.)
> 
> You could pick the default option using an election method (and even have an instant-win criterion if one is sensible). The mechanism does not enforce Plurality, only minimal defense.
> 
> Sorry for lack of other responses. I can't find enough time to write.
> 
> Kevin
> 
> 
> De : Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com>
> À : Election Methods <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> 
> Cc : Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
> Envoyé le : Dimanche 7 mai 2017 5h32
> Objet : Re: [EM] Ordering defeats in Minimax
> 
> > On 07 May 2017, at 12:39, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de <mailto:km_elmet at t-online.de>> wrote:
> > 
> > On 05/07/2017 10:58 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> >>> On 06 May 2017, at 23:26, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr <mailto:stepjak at yahoo.fr>
> >>> <mailto:stepjak at yahoo.fr <mailto:stepjak at yahoo.fr>>> wrote:
> > 
> >>> Legislators usually don't use election
> >>> methods. I would say essentially they figure out among themselves what
> >>> the outcome likely must be and then "elect" it, typically by a majority
> >>> vote. If voters could do that directly I think that would be the ideal
> >>> situation, as far as minimizing the need for strategy.
> >> 
> >> That's an interesting viewpoint. I'd like to see Condorcet tested in
> >> some parliaments. Although negotiations and Plurality can be used to
> >> solve many cases, also Condorcet and the idea of having multiple
> >> candidates could have some benefits. The first one in my mind is
> >> openness. Even when the "big boys" have agreed something behind the
> >> screens, and then bring that decision into a majority vote, some smaller
> >> groupings could add some alternatives in the election that they consider
> >> better. This would open up the available alternatives to the world
> >> (media, public), and all voters would have to take position on the
> >> presented alternatives. Small parties or groupings could thus make
> >> sensible compromise proposals that might even win, if they are good enough.
> > 
> > I think some parliaments use the following procedure for multiple proposals or amendments:
> > 
> > Some group decides the agenda (I'm not sure who; it probably depends on the parliament in question).
> > 
> > Then the parliament discusses the first two options, and does a majority vote between the two. It then does a majority vote between the winner so far and the next option, and so on until all options have been considered. The winner at the end of the procedure is the option that is accepted.
> > 
> > This method is Condorcet (because the CW beats everybody pairwise, and so whenever it becomes the winner so far, it'll stay the winner so far; and whenever it's the challenger, it will win against the winner so far and become the next winner so far). Furthermore, it's Smith. How cycles are broken depends on the agenda.
> 
> Yes, this is some sort of "serial Condorcet".  The biggest problem of this approach is probably the agenda based cycle breaking that you mentioned.
> 
> If there is a Condorcet winner, it will win. But if there is any chance of having a cycle, then the chairman (if he decides the agenda) may arrange the agenda so that his favourite option is the last one in the queue of options. With three candidates this already determines the order of all pairwise votes.
> 
> With three candidates the cycle could be either A>B>C>A or A>C>B>A. The chairman wants A to win. The first vote will therefore be between B and C. If we have cycle A>B>C>A, B will win the first round, and A will win the second round (against B).  If we have cycle A>C>B>A, C will win the first round, and A will win the second round (against C). The chairman could thus pick the preferred winner in the case that there is no Condorcet winner.
> 
> The voters could also try to use some strategies. This gives us some quite interesting strategy patterns, since after the agenda has been set, the method is no more symmetric with respect to the different options. A and B supporters could also join forces and vote against A at the last round, if they don't like the chairmans idea of constructing a strategic agenda.
> 
> 
> Juho
> 
> 
> 
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