[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

Thu Jun 22 22:02:43 PDT 2017

so many discussions here are more arcane than i can grok.  but i can grok most of this.

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Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Brian Olson" <bql at bolson.org>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 4:31 pm

To: "Richard Lung" <voting at ukscientists.com>

Cc: "EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

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> Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more information

> about a voter's preference or utility for the available choices.

> I can say

> A > B > C > D

> or I can say with more detail

> A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0

>

> If there is more information available, it is possible for an election

> algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent the voters

> and find the greater global utility winner.

but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to be tactical, insincerely.
how does the voter know that by rating Candidate B with 0.9 and not lower, that he is not helping this candidate beat his favorite, Candidate A?  maybe it should be 0.8.  or
0.5.
while Score voting requires too much information from the voters (making them act as a trained expert and consider quantitatively how candidates should be rated as if they are an Olympic ice skating judge) and while Approval doesn't get enough information from voters (does not
differentiate preference between two "approved" candidates), there has always been the problem of either Score voting or Approval voting facing the voter about what to do with their second choice (Candidate B).  how much juice should the voter give to Candidate B if they want B to
beat C but do not want B to beat A?  (and for Approval, the question is, having the same concern, shall the voter "approve" B or not?)

Score and Approval cannot answer that question in any simple manner.  but with Ranked-Choice the answer is clear.
and the other problem with Score is the "One-Person-One-Vote" standard.  if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only sorta like B
over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what disparate degree we like our candidates.  your vote for B should weigh just as much as my vote for A, even if my excitement for A exceeds your excitement for B.  that's what "one-person-one-vote" means.
i still just
do not get why Score and Approval (in application to governmental elections) have the following they do have.
bestest,
r b-j

>

> If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting populace we might

> ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are about each

> choice and get more information still.

> A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)

>

> And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the expected value

> of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.

and, except for making examples to show how a system breaks (like a Proof by Contradiction in mathematics), i just cannot see how judging the comparative value of systems with simulated assumptions is helpful.  there are not enough simulated cases to be able to consider how any
system will work under all conditions.

> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>

> wrote:

>

>>

>> Brian Olson,

>>

>> Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a constraint. Single

>> order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on ranked voting as a

>> multiple-order choice.

>> The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is that they

>> impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in one way or another,

>> and so are that much less true election methods.

>> (A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem to

>> apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)

>>

>> When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a count of

>> preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I grant you that

>> Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But I am not well informed

>> on this approach and know of no convincing reason why it should be adopted

>> or how you would persuade the public of that.) JFS Ross explained that

>> Laplace favored Method Borda because higher preferences were more important

>> and should count more. The Gregory method removes the objection to Borda of

>> "later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted count of

>> ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV leaves off.

>>

>> Richard Lung

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

>> On 22/06/2017 15:01, Brian Olson wrote:

>>

>> I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a election

>> method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set of desired

>> properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of desirable

>> properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost

>> trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the

>> rankings ballot.

>>

>> My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian one. A

>> person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an election and

>> everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we might count as

>> 0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a global

>> social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly knows every

>> person and elects the true global social utility maximizing candidate. This

>> sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to

>> complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's utility, the

>> imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot casting rather

>> than honest, messy computation and practical administration issues of

>> running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might wind up with

>> a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.

>>

>> But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have techniques

>> for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up in the real

>> world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet counted with

>> any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically applicable;

>> and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun

>> mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.

>>

>> What do you think of my model statement?

>> Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading towards?

>>

>>

>> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>

>> wrote:

>>

>>>

>>>

>>> The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

>>>

>>>

>>> For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that

>>> there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility

>>> supposition.

>>>

>>> That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a

>>> consistently derived right election result.

>>>

>>> If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge that

>>> there is a trade-off between electoral systems.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by

>>> which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.

>>>

>>> It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the

>>> electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,

>>> because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a progressive

>>> pursuit.

>>>

>>>

>>> --

>>> Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com

>>> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085

>>> E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books> in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

>>>

>>>

>>

>> --

>> Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com

>> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085

>> E-books in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

>>

>>

--
r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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