[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

[Brian Olson]

I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a election
method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set of desired
properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of desirable
properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost
trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the
rankings ballot.

My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian one. A
person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an election and
everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we might count as
0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a global
social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly knows every
person and elects the true global social utility maximizing candidate. This
sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's utility, the
imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot casting rather
than honest, messy computation and practical administration issues of
running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might wind up with
a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.

But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have techniques
for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up in the real
world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet counted with
any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically applicable;
and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun
mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.

What do you think of my model statement?
Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading towards?


On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>
wrote:

>
>
> The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
>
>
> For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
> there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
> supposition.
>
> That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
> consistently derived right election result.
>
> If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge that
> there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
>
>
>
> Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
> which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
>
> It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
> electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
> because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a progressive
> pursuit.
>
>
>
> --
> Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
> E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books> in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
>
>
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>
>
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