<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a election method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set of desired properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of desirable properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the rankings ballot.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian one. A person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an election and everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we might count as 0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a global social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly knows every person and elects the true global social utility maximizing candidate. This sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's utility, the imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot casting rather than honest, messy computation and practical administration issues of running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might wind up with a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have techniques for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up in the real world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet counted with any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically applicable; and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">What do you think of my model statement?</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading towards?</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold";color:black">The election
methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems
paradox.<br>
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<p class="MsoNormal">
</p><p class="MsoNormal"><span>For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off
theory of elections
that there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the
impossibility
supposition.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>That supposition implies some conception (albeit
non-existent) of
a consistently derived right election result.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>If there is no such measure, then there is no
standard even to
judge that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice,
setting a standard
by which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic
consistency.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>It follows that the election result will only be
as consistent as
the electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right
election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as
a progressive
pursuit.<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><u></u><u></u></font></span></span></p><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<span><u></u><u></u></span></font></span><p></p><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
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<pre class="m_2969095498426562027moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com" target="_blank">http://www.voting.<wbr>ukscientists.com</a>
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