[EM] [CES #16423] Re: Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments)

[Jameson Quinn]

I agree that MJ3-2-1 would be a good method. (Minor point: I'd use
graduated majority judgment instead of MJ, because it gives a simple
real-number "graduated median" which can be used for tiebreakers, while the
MJ tiebreaker was optimized for compliance proofs).

Still, as a practical reform proposal, I don't want to pollute 3-2-1's
relative simplicity.

2017-06-12 13:41 GMT-04:00 Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com>:

> IMO the 3-2-1 methodology of 3-best, 2-least-worst, 1-most-preferred is
> not just a specific method, but a filter that could be applied to other
> methods.  In the spirit of the original 3-2-1, the initial method should
> satisfy the favorite betrayal criterion (FBC).
>
> I currently like the idea of using the 3-2-1 filter with Majority Judgment
> as the initial "3-best" method, since 3-2-1 eliminates (at least
> practically) the participation criterion issue with MJ.
>
> On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 6:27 AM, 'Steve Cobb' via The Center for Election
> Science <electionscience at googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> If the name encapsulated a description of what the voting method is, the
>> name would change naturally with the method. When the name is the author's
>> name, or something cute like 3-2-1 or IRV, you'd append a clarification for
>> minor changes. If Toby came up with a significantly different and clever
>> variation of 3-2-1, maybe you'd call it Quinn-Pereira Voting.
>>
>> About ownership... does Warren own Score Voting? Maybe 3-2-1 should be
>> called Three-Value Score Voting with Three-Step Tally.
>>
>> On Saturday, June 10, 2017 at 6:28:43 PM UTC+2, Toby Pereira wrote:
>>>
>>> Minor changes can be seen as variants of the same method. For example,
>>> someone might define a Condorcet method using margins, and someone else
>>> might prefer the winning votes version. But you wouldn't give it a
>>> different name. You'd call it x with winning votes. But then I suppose that
>>> doesn't answer the question of whether the inventor or anyone else can
>>> change the "canonical" version - the version where you don't have to
>>> specify anything else about it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>> *From:* Jameson Quinn
>>> *To:* electionsciencefoundation; EM
>>> *Sent:* Saturday, 10 June 2017, 17:04
>>> *Subject:* Re: [EM] Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments)
>>>
>>> This raises a larger question: should the inventor of a voting method be
>>> able to change the rules without changing the name? Once a proposal is
>>> public, who owns it — the inventor or the public?
>>>
>>> I don't think the answer is always clear-cut. If I wanted to redefine
>>> 3-2-1 to be something totally different, that wouldn't be OK. If somebody
>>> else wanted to use the name 3-2-1 for something substantially the same, but
>>> with minor rule changes, I might talk or argue with them about whether
>>> their rule changes were a good idea, but I think I'd probably still let
>>> them use the name.
>>>
>>> But for smaller rule changes, I think it's OK for the inventor of a
>>> method to make adjustments.
>>>
>>> 2017-06-10 11:14 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn:
>>>
>>> Since creating 3-2-1 voting
>>> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting> and GOLD voting
>>> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>,
>>> I've continued to work on refining the rules. I'm arbitrarily deciding that
>>> it's time to send an update now, because they're getting pretty stable.
>>> Future changes are still possible, but I think that on each system the
>>> chances are better than even that the only changes from here on will be
>>> simplifying the wording, not substantive differences.
>>>
>>> On 3-2-1, here are the rules in addition to the basic "3 most good, 2
>>> least bad, 1 more preferred" dynamic:
>>>
>>>    - Optional delegation: if you vote just one candidate as "good", any
>>>    blank ratings you leave will be filled in by that candidate's predeclared
>>>    ratings. Predeclarations default to "bad".
>>>    - 3rd semifinalist: the third semifinalist must...
>>>       - ...not be of the same party as the first two semifinalists (if
>>>       there are party labels). If this would happen, just skip to the next
>>>       highest "good" as the third semifinalist.
>>>          - This means a party can't win by running 3 clones against a
>>>          divided field. There could still in theory be "clone parties", but it seems
>>>          unlikely that over 1/3 of voters would go along with such naked
>>>          strategizing.
>>>       - ...have at least half as many "good" ratings as the top
>>>       semifinalist. If this would happen, just take the top two as finalists,
>>>       skipping the second "2 least bad" round.
>>>          - This ensures that you can't win just by being a "stealth
>>>          centrist" with little direct support.
>>>
>>> On GOLD, here are the changes from the original version:
>>>
>>>    - Pre-eliminations
>>>       - The top candidate in each riding, based on local votes alone,
>>>       is never eliminated.
>>>       - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only,
>>>       is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the
>>>       top.
>>>       - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local
>>>       votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes
>>>       (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local
>>>       candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those
>>>       of" includes non-local votes.)
>>>    - STV elimination order: eliminate in order of who's furthest behind
>>>    in their riding
>>>       - If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including
>>>       everything: local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the
>>>       top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then
>>>       they are 1000 behind in their riding.
>>>
>>> These rule adjustments for GOLD work to ensure that the voters within a
>>> riding have a significant say in who represents them, and out-of-riding
>>> votes matter only at the margin.
>>>
>>> I've also been thinking about rule adjustments for 3RD (the nonpartisan
>>> proportional system that's a cross between 321 and GOLD). That was part of
>>> why I started the other thread on proportional summability. But I'm not
>>> really satisfied that that system is "done" at the level of 321 and GOLD,
>>> so I'm not going to talk about the current version of those rules here.
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>>
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