[EM] [CES #16423] Re: Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments)

Ted Stern dodecatheon at gmail.com
Mon Jun 12 10:41:31 PDT 2017


IMO the 3-2-1 methodology of 3-best, 2-least-worst, 1-most-preferred is not
just a specific method, but a filter that could be applied to other
methods.  In the spirit of the original 3-2-1, the initial method should
satisfy the favorite betrayal criterion (FBC).

I currently like the idea of using the 3-2-1 filter with Majority Judgment
as the initial "3-best" method, since 3-2-1 eliminates (at least
practically) the participation criterion issue with MJ.

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 6:27 AM, 'Steve Cobb' via The Center for Election
Science <electionscience at googlegroups.com> wrote:

> If the name encapsulated a description of what the voting method is, the
> name would change naturally with the method. When the name is the author's
> name, or something cute like 3-2-1 or IRV, you'd append a clarification for
> minor changes. If Toby came up with a significantly different and clever
> variation of 3-2-1, maybe you'd call it Quinn-Pereira Voting.
>
> About ownership... does Warren own Score Voting? Maybe 3-2-1 should be
> called Three-Value Score Voting with Three-Step Tally.
>
> On Saturday, June 10, 2017 at 6:28:43 PM UTC+2, Toby Pereira wrote:
>>
>> Minor changes can be seen as variants of the same method. For example,
>> someone might define a Condorcet method using margins, and someone else
>> might prefer the winning votes version. But you wouldn't give it a
>> different name. You'd call it x with winning votes. But then I suppose that
>> doesn't answer the question of whether the inventor or anyone else can
>> change the "canonical" version - the version where you don't have to
>> specify anything else about it.
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Jameson Quinn
>> *To:* electionsciencefoundation; EM
>> *Sent:* Saturday, 10 June 2017, 17:04
>> *Subject:* Re: [EM] Updates on 3-2-1 and GOLD (minor rule adjustments)
>>
>> This raises a larger question: should the inventor of a voting method be
>> able to change the rules without changing the name? Once a proposal is
>> public, who owns it — the inventor or the public?
>>
>> I don't think the answer is always clear-cut. If I wanted to redefine
>> 3-2-1 to be something totally different, that wouldn't be OK. If somebody
>> else wanted to use the name 3-2-1 for something substantially the same, but
>> with minor rule changes, I might talk or argue with them about whether
>> their rule changes were a good idea, but I think I'd probably still let
>> them use the name.
>>
>> But for smaller rule changes, I think it's OK for the inventor of a
>> method to make adjustments.
>>
>> 2017-06-10 11:14 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn:
>>
>> Since creating 3-2-1 voting
>> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting> and GOLD voting
>> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>,
>> I've continued to work on refining the rules. I'm arbitrarily deciding that
>> it's time to send an update now, because they're getting pretty stable.
>> Future changes are still possible, but I think that on each system the
>> chances are better than even that the only changes from here on will be
>> simplifying the wording, not substantive differences.
>>
>> On 3-2-1, here are the rules in addition to the basic "3 most good, 2
>> least bad, 1 more preferred" dynamic:
>>
>>    - Optional delegation: if you vote just one candidate as "good", any
>>    blank ratings you leave will be filled in by that candidate's predeclared
>>    ratings. Predeclarations default to "bad".
>>    - 3rd semifinalist: the third semifinalist must...
>>       - ...not be of the same party as the first two semifinalists (if
>>       there are party labels). If this would happen, just skip to the next
>>       highest "good" as the third semifinalist.
>>          - This means a party can't win by running 3 clones against a
>>          divided field. There could still in theory be "clone parties", but it seems
>>          unlikely that over 1/3 of voters would go along with such naked
>>          strategizing.
>>       - ...have at least half as many "good" ratings as the top
>>       semifinalist. If this would happen, just take the top two as finalists,
>>       skipping the second "2 least bad" round.
>>          - This ensures that you can't win just by being a "stealth
>>          centrist" with little direct support.
>>
>> On GOLD, here are the changes from the original version:
>>
>>    - Pre-eliminations
>>       - The top candidate in each riding, based on local votes alone, is
>>       never eliminated.
>>       - The second candidate in each riding, counting local votes only,
>>       is eliminated only if their local votes are fewer than half those of the
>>       top.
>>       - Others are eliminated by default, surviving only if their local
>>       votes are more than half those of the top AND their total direct votes
>>       (including non-local write-ins) are more than those of the top local
>>       candidate. (For this rule, "top" is counted by local votes only, but "those
>>       of" includes non-local votes.)
>>    - STV elimination order: eliminate in order of who's furthest behind
>>    in their riding
>>       - If a candidate's current full tally is 1000 votes (including
>>       everything: local votes, direct write-ins, and transferred votes), and the
>>       top full tally of any remaining candidate in their riding is 2000, then
>>       they are 1000 behind in their riding.
>>
>> These rule adjustments for GOLD work to ensure that the voters within a
>> riding have a significant say in who represents them, and out-of-riding
>> votes matter only at the margin.
>>
>> I've also been thinking about rule adjustments for 3RD (the nonpartisan
>> proportional system that's a cross between 321 and GOLD). That was part of
>> why I started the other thread on proportional summability. But I'm not
>> really satisfied that that system is "done" at the level of 321 and GOLD,
>> so I'm not going to talk about the current version of those rules here.
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>>
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