[EM] Majority Judgment avoids Arrow's Theorem (paradox)

[Juho Laatu]

I just note that one could try nomination strategies / teaming also in Random Pair (e.g. 100 republican candidates against 1 democrat).

BR, Juho


> On 06 Jun 2017, at 12:32, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
> 
> On 06/06/2017 01:22 AM, fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com wrote:
>> Arrow's theorem only applies to ranked systems, while MJ is a rated
>> system (as are Score/Range, SRV/STAR, Approval, etc.)  Later in life,
>> Arrow supported rated systems:
>> https://electology.org/podcasts/2012-10-06_kenneth_arrow
>> <https://electology.org/podcasts/2012-10-06_kenneth_arrow>
>> 
>> Gibbard's theorem is supposed to apply to all conceivable voting
>> systems, though.
> 
> Just to be precise, to all conceivable _deterministic_ voting systems. Any random method of the type:
> 
> - With probability x%, choose the Random Ballot winner,
> - With probability (100-x)%, choose the Random Pair winner
> 
> is strategyproof. It's also not very good.
> 
> To be even more precise, Random Winner is also strategyproof as far as strategy from the voters is concerned, because the ballots are never looked at. It has an obvious teaming strategy, however. And dictatorial systems are strategyproof, but lacking for other reasons.
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