[EM] Clone-proof STAR (Score+Automatic Runoff)
km_elmet at t-online.de
Tue Jul 25 13:46:23 PDT 2017
On 07/25/2017 08:46 PM, Ted Stern wrote:
> [Related to a topic that was discussed earlier on the Election-Methods
> list --
> STAR is described here: http://www.equal.vote/
> It is vulnerable to crowding -- too many clones could prevent the
> top-two score winners from capturing the variance-minimizing candidate
> in the pairwise runoff.
> One relatively simple way to deal with clones is to reweight the ballots
> of voters, and then choose one of the remaining candidates in some way.
Some DSV thoughts along those lines:
The most obvious way of making crowding go away is to simply remove the
ballots of the voters who voted for the winner. But that may cause
regret because of a vote-management situation, e.g. X has total rating
100, Z has total rating 91, and Y has total rating 90; and someone who
voted for both X and Y gets his vote removed, whereas he could have
helped Y get more votes if he hadn't voted for X. So he would have
preferred to only vote for Y unless that would have made X lose.
So suppose X is the Range winner and so is chosen as one of the top two.
Then we could do a (relatively simple) DSV this way:
For each other candidate Y, maximize Y's score by turning "X and Y"
votes into "only Y" votes, subject to:
- X has to be the Range winner (i.e. top scoring candidate) after the
transformation too - or Y has to be the Range winner and X second,
- You have to remove all remaining untransformed "X and Y" votes when
counting Y's support.
The transformation would only be temporary, i.e. when considering Y's
score, use the unmodified ballots + transformation to get Y's score,
then when considering Z's score, use the unmodified ballots +
transformation to get Z's score. The candidate with the greatest
modified score is the second candidate for the runoff.
Unfortunately, this is rather complex, and simplicity is supposed to be
STAR's thing, so I don't know how useful it is. There may be some second
order/pushover strategy incentive as well, e.g. someone who wants Z to
win, where Z is not very well liked by X-voters and Y is in second place
by unmodified ratings, votes Z and Y so as to decrease the margin X has
down to Y, in an attempt to deny "X and Other" votes from going to Other.
(Using this kind of DSV is much easier with threshold-based methods
because then the threshold is fixed, so the second order strategy is
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