[EM] New election system in Hungary

Toby Pereira tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk
Tue Jul 18 11:24:20 PDT 2017

I meant to reply to this sooner, but as I mentioned in a reply about Jameson Quinn's GOLD method, the method I described here https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/electionscience/aP7ybKMb1zs/giaYAh6wAwAJ would arguably work well. It's a proportional mixed-member method. And while I talk about score voting there, it could be just as easily used with the simpler approval voting. I also discuss the method in this video  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjeBEBZjm9Y and you can see the simplicity of the score ballot at 2:33 and the approval ballot at 12:10.

      From: Magosányi Árpád <m4gw4s at gmail.com>
 To: Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com 
 Sent: Tuesday, 4 July 2017, 10:54
 Subject: [EM] New election system in Hungary

Please help, it is really important!

We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary. A strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high chance that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be influental for the future of our election system.

Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion between the parties (most of them will be participating). It is designed to be not too shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal system, for the following tactical communication reasons:
 - show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
 - pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be successful based on their instinctive behaviour
Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not accepting the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most probably sizeable factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal system as the core issue we are fighting for.

Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system, with proportional representation and no entry threshold.

I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as preferential Condorcet for a commitee:
- The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
- In the long run there is no two-party system

Also, I would like to have easy ballots.

What I have came up with, and why:

Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs active participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a government office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties with the highest number of nominations will be in the ballot.

There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of each party.

The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.

The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a 200-member list).

The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method, and ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated by the nominating party).

The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a pairwise defeat table, where
- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins over the other candidate
- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5

The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.

Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit more constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency (10M) and human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not change anything.

My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between range voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As condorcet comes with the above game theory results, and in range voting majority condorcet is strategically forced, I feel that this method should also have the same game theory results.

But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can build my proof on?
If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?

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