[EM] New election system in Hungary

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Wed Jul 5 12:47:05 PDT 2017

On 07/05/2017 08:47 AM, Magosányi Árpád wrote:
> 2017-07-04 19:58 GMT+02:00 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com
> <mailto:jameson.quinn at gmail.com>>:
>>     Before you jump straight into designing mechanisms, it's important
>>     to be clear about what you're looking for: the values you want the
>>     method to fulfill. On that matter, you've said the method should be:
>>      1. not too shockingly new
>>      2. "proportional representation...
>>      3. ...and no entry threshold"
>>      4.
>>         The winning strategy for candidates is collaboration
>>      5.
>>         The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
>>      6.
>>         In the long run there is no two-party system
>>     In the end, you're definitely going to have to compromise to at
>>     least some degree on points 1, 4, and 5.
> #1 is not a requirement in my work. There are two proposals: one is a
> basis for discussion for parties, which should be conservative, the
> second is an ideal system as the proposal of the movement, which can
> bring in anything new, but if possible should build on the previous one.
> I am talking about the later now.

I forgot to mention: it's sometimes argued that party list methods 
without thresholds are vulnerable to very weak parties (single-issue 
parties even) getting a kingmaker position.

One way to alleviate that is to give a majoritarian bonus -- according 
to a method that finds a candidate with broad support, like Condorcet 
does. So e.g. if you have a parliament of 200 seats, instead of just 
having a 2% threshold, give four seats to the party elected by a 
Condorcet method when the whole nation's party list votes are fed to 
that method.

The advantage of using a good single-winner method instead of just using 
something like, say, D'Hondt instead of Sainte-Laguë for the party list 
aspect, is that the bonus goes to the center, not to the largest parties.

This, of course, requires that the voters use ranked ballots for the 
party list elections so that the majoritarian method has anything to go 
by. Thus it's not all that good without a ranked method for the 
proportional election, since there wouldn't be much of an incentive by 
the voters to fully rank their ballots.

A similar idea can be found here: 

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list