[EM] New election system in Hungary

Richard Lung voting at ukscientists.com
Wed Jul 5 00:45:55 PDT 2017

Hello Magosányi Árpád,
My father came from your part of the world (annexed by Romania after 
WW1) but my out-look on election method is a world away from yours and 
this election methods group, which usually over-looks my posts! These 
views of mine are essentially in the tradition of John Stuart Mill. 
Nevertheless, I hope wou will look at my book, "Scientific Method of 
Elections, or the simpler "Peace-making Power-sharing" which starts with 
the Canadian Citizens Assemblies. Not to mention the less methodical and 
more theoretical: Science is Ethics as Electics.
They are linked from my "Democracy Science" page.

Richard Lung.

On 04/07/2017 10:53, Magosányi Árpád wrote:
> Hi,
> Please help, it is really important!
> We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary. 
> A strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high 
> chance that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be 
> influental for the future of our election system.
> Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion 
> between the parties (most of them will be participating). It is 
> designed to be not too shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal 
> system, for the following tactical communication reasons:
>  - show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
>  - pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be 
> successful based on their instinctive behaviour
> Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election 
> methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not 
> accepting the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most 
> probably sizeable factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal 
> system as the core issue we are fighting for.
> Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system, 
> with proportional representation and no entry threshold.
> I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal 
> system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as 
> preferential Condorcet for a commitee:
> - The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
> - The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
> - In the long run there is no two-party system
> Also, I would like to have easy ballots.
> What I have came up with, and why:
> Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs 
> active participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a 
> government office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties 
> with the highest number of nominations will be in the ballot.
> There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of 
> each party.
> The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be 
> allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.
> The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can 
> indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a 
> 200-member list).
> The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method, 
> and ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated 
> by the nominating party).
> The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a 
> pairwise defeat table, where
> - the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins 
> over the other candidate
> - in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5
> The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.
> Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit 
> more constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency 
> (10M) and human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not 
> change anything.
> My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between 
> range voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As 
> condorcet comes with the above game theory results, and in range 
> voting majority condorcet is strategically forced, I feel that this 
> method should also have the same game theory results.
> But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on 
> mathematical proof.
> Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can 
> build my proof on?
> If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em  for list info

Richard Lung.
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
E-books in epub format:

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