[EM] hmmm. Maybe I missed something before SF passed IRV then called it RCV?

[robert bristow-johnson]

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Subject: [EM] hmmm. Maybe I missed something before SF passed IRV then called it RCV?

From: "Sennet Williams" <sennetwilliams at yahoo.com>

Date: Sat, July 1, 2017 2:46 am

To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

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> If so, I conditionally apologize. 
i'm only mad at FairVote (for misappropriating the term which will result in misconceptions and confusion with the same reform-minded public).  not you.
> I had certainly never heard of the term "RCV" until an anti-IRV SF
election commissioner suggested that RCV would be a better name and no one objected.  That was around 1990(?), after the SF measure was passed but before it was implemented.  The vote redistribution method is apparently exactly the same in SF, Oakland and Berkeley, all which were voted on
as "I.R.V.", but are now usually referred to as RCV.
yes.  and that (mis)appropriation of the term by FairVote to apply solely to IRV is objectionable.  it's like Discovery Institute appropriating the term "Intelligent Design".


>   If the term R.C.V. had actually been used before that election commission meeting then the implication is that I.R.V. is merely a type of RCV, so I learned something new.
RCV means a ranked ballot which people mark "1, 2, 3..."  IRV (sometimes called Hare or STV for
single transferable vote) is one method of tabulating. Borda is another.  Bucklin yet another.  and then there are several Condorcet-compliant methods (which differ only in how a "cycle" or Condorcet paradox, which i am convinced is and will be extremely rare, is
resolved).

> But if that day was actually the  first use of R.C.V., and now someone is applying it to competing counting methods, then that is CO-OPTION, with IRV's competitors trying to take advantage of IRV's huge success in the Bay Area. 
remember that IRV "success", even in the
Bay area may be fleeting.  since there were so many candidates and only 3 levels of ranking, IRV in SF and Oakland has the effect of disenfranchising people who vote their true preferences and find out after the race is over that the real race was between people they didn't mark at all.
 at least in Burlington Vermont, we had as many ranking levels as there were candidates on the ballot (5).


> Personally, I think that some other ranked ballot systems (like Condorcet) are theoretically more logical but functionally more difficult, but either one would have the same effect on politics.
actually Condorcet is simpler conceptually than IRV and since *sometimes* IRV does not elect
the Condorcet winner, there is a **different** effect on the politics.  this is why you should read up (on Warren's page) about how IRV failed in Burlington in 2009.  i also wrote a paper that i was not able to get published, but i can send you (or anyone else) a copy.
not only is
Condorcet simpler than IRV, that precinct-summability that Kathy mentioned is important.  Condorcet allows for transmission of subtotals from precincts up to the central tabulation for the grand totals.  IRV requires that a record of *every* ballot (and that ballot's specific ranking) be
transmitted from the precinct up to the central tabulation.
Condorcet is simpler.  the only problem with Condorcet (in my opinion) is the very low risk of a cycle (like Rock Paper Scissors).  Then you cannot satisfy the basic premise that we don't elect someone if more of the voters
have marked their ballots that they preferred someone else.  but something like Schulze or Tideman Ranked Pairs can resolve that cycle in a sensible way (not that everyone will be satisfied, but that doesn't happen with every election outcome anyway).
>  As for
"weighted" systems, that would not be legal for official U.S. elections.  (Each voter can only have one vote)
i'm with you there.  Score voting is for Olympic ice skating judges, not for governmental elections.  voters should not be tasked with the tactical burden to
think up what scores best serve their political interests.

> I haven't seen the specific text of Don Beyer's. "Fair Representation Act," but I have seen it looks like a variation of Choice Voting being referred to as RCV, but that is not going to pass anyway.

> I predict that specific voting system that will be most successful is  "The Maine System" defined by the Question Five:  IRV used for partisan primaries followed by IRV used for the general election.  (The use of a coin flip to break ties is not legal, so scratch that
part.)----
in Vermont, if there is an election where the top two candidates are tied after an exhaustive recount, i believe there is a coin toss.  i think that **is** legal.



--
r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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