[EM] goal of a better election method
steve bosworth
stevebosworth at hotmail.com
Sun Feb 19 01:03:25 PST 2017
________________________________
From: Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com> on behalf of election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2017 5:31 PM
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 152, Issue 7
2. Re: ?goal of a better election method? (Kevin Venzke)
Message: 2
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2017 17:31:37 +0000 (UTC)
From: Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
To: steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>, EM list
<election-methods at electorama.com>
Subject: Re: [EM] ?goal of a better election method?
Message-ID: <1346455147.4984684.1486920697303 at mail.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Hi Kevin:
>S: Secondly, I believe that B&L ? prove? (pp. 15, 19, 186-198) that MJ provides only about ? half? the incentives? >or opportunities for anti-democratic ?strategic? voting to be successful. If you disagree, please explain the flaw in their argument.
K: What I understood from Kristofer's Jan 4 explanation of page 15 is that?this halving of the manipulability is not meant to be a comparison to?any other methods. It's a comparison to a (rather strange) hypothetical situation. If so, this claim on its own could be true but is of unclear value.
Possibly this argument is used to build up to a larger argument. But when it gets stated on its own it feels misleading to me, because there's no way for the reader to understand what this "half" is half of.
S: No, B&L clearly explain why MJ provides only about “half” of the incentives and opportunities to “manipulate” the results as compared to all the methods that gain their results by “summing” or “averaging” all the votes. In his reply to me, Kristofer also gave me a link to the following source in which B&L concisely state the same claim on slide 150. This is in the middle of their discussion of “strategy”, i.e. between slides 143 & 185:
Kristofer: See this slide set by B&L for more on that:
http://igm.univ-mlv.fr/AlgoB/algoperm2012/01Laraki.pdf .
Majority Judgement - Measuring, Ranking and Electing<http://igm.univ-mlv.fr/AlgoB/algoperm2012/01Laraki.pdf>
igm.univ-mlv.fr
Traditional Methods and results Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking Majority Judgement: Two Applications Majority Judgement Measuring, Ranking and Electing
I look forward to your feedback.
Steve
Kevin
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