[EM] MMPO objections (hopefully better posted)

[Michael Ossipoff]

This matter is moot, because Smith//MMPO has replaced Plain MMPO as an
advocacy of mine.

...partly because I wouldn't want to devote time & writing-space to
answering these prejudices when offering proposals.

...partly because rank methods are for people who want or need to rank,
making Smith a good trade for FBC.

Replying farther down. Can't delete text:

On Sep 20, 2016 5:29 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>
> Mike,
>
> The  MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO)  "bad example" we are talking
about:
>
> x: A
> 1: A=C
> 1: B=C
> x: B
>
> x  = any number greater than 1.   MMPO elects C.

Yes

Replying farther down. Can't delete text.

>
>
>
> On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
nearly everyone?
>>
>> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the
voters.
>>
>> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>>
>> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
>>
>> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to each other's
candidate.
>
You said:

>
> C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.

Yes, there is.

The ballots show that the A voters collectively prefer C to B.

If the A voters voted between B & C, they'd choose C.

Likewise for the B voters. In a vote, they'd choose C over A.


>
>
>> Surely the importance of  bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>
>
> C: Not when it's that bad.

You haven't shown that it's bad. You've told why it bothers your prejudices.

Anyway, even if it were bad,  how bad is something bad that won't happen?

You continue. I reply farther down.

And not even when it's merely very bad in such a simple example.  It is
more understandable
> and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
complicated example (with say, lots of candidates
> and cycles within cycles).
>
>
>> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>
>
> C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question.

(endquote)

Ok, whom does it wrong?

:^)

Not the A voters, none of whom prefer B to C.

You think it's plausible & likely to happen?

You said:

Other methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm with a
random-fill incentive?

(endquote)

I didn't advocate it for LNHa. Not even for FBC.

It's main merits are Weak CD & MAM-like strategy.  (available with
Smith//MMPO too).

No, few other methods share those properties.

You continued:

> The result is completely outrageous and absurd.

Thank you for sharing your subjective prejudices.

Who is wronged by the "outrage"?

Yes, I admit that you're used to positional methods & pairwise defeat
methods.  ...& that many people are troubled by what they aren't used to.

> The correct result is an A=B tie.  All but 2 of the voters were wronged,
because their favourites should have a 50%  probability of winning.

Nonsense. B isn't one of the A voters' favorites.

When you're indifferent between 2 candidates, you aren't wronged when one
wins instead of the other.

Michael Ossipoff

> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
> On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>> A few more comments:
>>
>> Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone bottom-rated by
nearly everyone?
>>
>> How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at least half of the
voters.
>>
>> ...& because it isn't a positional method.
>>
>> Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a lot of help from
everyone else.
>>
>> ...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C to eachother's candidate.
>>
>> Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or outrageous.
>>
>> Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.
>>
>> Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its plausibility.
>>
>> Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I don't like that.
It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better from a pairwise-count method.
>>
>> But with sincere voting, & with no indifference, the CWs (sincere CW)
always wins.
>>
>> For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir pairwise comparisons
to have high turnout, & be relatively nearly tied.   ...& for someone
else's pairwise comparisons to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly
tied.
>>
>> Would you give up the best combination of the best strategy properties
because of a funny, but not outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong
anyone, in a thoroughly implausible example?
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
>>> Subject: MMPO objections
>>> To: <t at gmail.com>
>>> Cc:
>>>
>>> Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't
been thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.
>>>
>>> But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments
against MMPO, & it can be said to have  already been well-discussed.
>>>
>>> No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
something ridiculous.
>>>
>>> A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
standards.
>>>
>>> MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise
unpreferredness.
>>>
>>> It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it
does terribly, positionally.
>>>
>>> In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.
>>>
>>> It certainly isn't a positional method
>>>
>>> MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where
it does terribly by pairwise defeats.
>>>
>>> In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses
to the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.
>>>
>>> It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.
>>>
>>> We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we
tend, maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.
>>>
>>> A "beats-diagram" shows
>>> an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.
>>>
>>> But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the
other half bottom-end vote B.
>>>
>>> Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising
cancel out, making both groups un-despised?
>>>
>>> But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you
to believe.
>>>
>>> If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.
>>>
>>> If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.
>>>
>>> C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
eachother's candidates.
>>>
>>> Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie
would be proud.
>>>
>>> Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
possible.
>>>
>>> I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.
>>>
>>> It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it
achieves the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.
>>>
>>> Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness
compromise, a compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs
an actual practical problem, one that will routinely
>>> make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.
>>>
>>> When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of
whatever size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to
each, & their answers.   ...& telling the advantages of each.
>>>
>>> It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.
>>>
>>> Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee
choose for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.
>>>
>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>>
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