[EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

Toby Pereira tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk
Sun Sep 11 14:55:01 PDT 2016

On the exclusion thing (or a not by candidates' names), I suppose arguably it's not really a part of the U/P method, because it's a completely detachable module, and something like it could be applied (or not) to any voting system. It's a bit like winning votes v margins. If someone invents a Condorcet method and says it's to be used with winning votes, then it's still the "same method" if someone uses it with margins.

On a related note, I see people talking about MAM a lot - but as far as I can see it's not really a method. It's just a specific form of ranked pairs! 

On Thu, 8/9/16, Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

 Subject: Re: [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
 To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com, cbenham at adam.com.au
 Date: Thursday, 8 September, 2016, 23:49
 This thread is getting increasingly
 difficult to follow. Am I to take it that the definition in
 the bit quoted from 9/9/2016 at 12:39 is the latest
 definition of U/P? As that time is currently in the future
 for the UK and anywhere west of it (and conveniently 9/9
 means the same wherever you go), it should be fairly
 But now I see this bit about having a note by candidates'
 names if they got majority unacceptable in the last election
 - what is this madness? What does this achieve? Presumably
 most candidates standing would get majority unacceptable as
 it would probably be most people's default rating. Obviously
 it's better than excluding them, but unless I've missed a
 chunk of conversation, this seems like a fairly arbitrary
 punishment to hand out to losers.
 On Thu, 8/9/16, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au>
  Subject: Re: [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple
 3-level method.
  To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
  Date: Thursday, 8 September, 2016, 20:20
      On 9/9/2016
  12:39 AM, Jameson Quinn
        The main advantage of U/P
            voting over
 other systems like MJ or MCA is
  simplicity of
 So I'm going to try to describe
  it as simply as
            To vote, you
 rate each person running as
    "acceptable", or
  "unacceptable". You can rate any number at
            If more than
 half of voters rate a person
 person can't win, unless the same is
  true of all the
 running. Of those remaining, the winner
  is the one
 "preferred" by the most
        C:  By this definition, the
 U/P method uses a simple
  3-slot ballot
        just like MTA and MCA.
 Again, I'd be interested in seeing a
  plausible example
              of when
 U/P doesn't elect the Approval
    Threshold in approval is >>. In
  voters are as
    expressive as possible.
          C: On 3-slot ratings
 ballots, how are the 20 A
  supporters able
          to vote one
 unapproved candidate above the
        On the 3-slot ballots, they
  vote A>B.
          On the 2-slot
 ballots, they vote A. These are
        C: But above you are
 suggesting that U/P somehow uses
  a both a
        2-slot ballot and a 3-slot
 ballot.  Which is it?
        Actually it seems to me that
 the stripped-down 3-slot
  version (if
        default rating is
 "Unacceptable") is
  actually the same method
        as MTA. "Unacceptable" is
 just the inverse
  of "Approved".  Any
        candidate who doesn't get a
  "Unacceptable" score must
        get a majority Approval
        I prefer MTA's more positive
 wording.  In U/P it
  seems as though
        the middle rating slot
 doesn't do anything.
        Any candidate, including an
            incumbent, who
 had gotten over 50%
  "unacceptable" in the prior
            election would
 have a note to that effect next to
  their name
            on the ballot.
 (In prior messages, I'd
  suggested not allowing
            them on the
 ballot. I now think that allowing them
  on, but
            with a note,
 would be
        C: Yes, that is far less
 draconian, a big improvement,
  and not a
        big deal.  I suppose
 there's nothing wrong with a
  bit of history.
        Chris Benham
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