[EM] Fwd: The Top-Set. Method-Merit.
email9648742 at gmail.com
Thu Sep 8 10:33:19 PDT 2016
I never meant to say that those 3 Bucklin versions are better than U/P.
3-Slot ICT, U/P, & TTR MGR are my favorite methods.
I call them, collectively, CD Approval, or Deluxe Approval.
When I named the best rank methods, I was referring to unlimited rankings.
I was mistaken to say that Plain Bucklin dominates MJ. Plain Bucklin
doesn't allow Approval voting.
But ER Bucklin & Bucklin B or A allow Approval voting & meet MMC.
I once suggested using top count when > 1 candidate gets a majority in
I don't know who 1st suggested that for general Bucklin, but a too count
should be used in all Bucklin, to choose between n candidates
simultaneously getting majority.
Jameson also suggested using top count if no one gets majority. I'd
considered that, but rejected it because then it stops being Approval.
But, does Bucklin's majority property need it to be Approval to the end?
No, I'd say.
It seems to me that Bucklin should use top count for simultaneous
majorities, & for no majorities.
Chris' alternative majority for Bucklin, IBIFA, makes sense by not letting
added ballots sloil a majority.
It isn't complicated. It says to substitute, for the # of ballots not
ranking X in the top n ranks, the largest # of approvals those ballots gjve
But, due to its unfamiliarity & newness, it should be reserved as a later
refinement, for after Bucklin is enacted.
On Sep 7, 2016 8:11 AM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn at gmail.com> wrote:
> ...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
> This is, of course, moving away from abstract voting theory into concrete
> politics. I'm going to follow that move. I don't want this to turn into a
> thread on the list, though; so, if you want to answer this, feel free to
> respond to individually to me and/or Mike (at the "Janet Robinson"
> address), without including the list.
> So, you consider Hillary to be a "dismal pessimistic compromise". It seems
> likely you're saying this from the left, as otherwise she wouldn't be any
> kind of compromise, but simply the greater evil.
> In an absolute sense, you may well be right. But I think the relevant
> comparison set is that of historical presidents, and perhaps major party
> nominees as well. In that comparison set, I'd argue that Hillary is
> actually among the more progressive, more honest, and more competent as an
> administrator; and that she's not significantly worse than average in terms
> of her inherent charisma and skills as a campaigner.
> Note that I'm NOT saying that she is actually progressive, honest, or
> competent in an absolute sense. Far from it. I'm just saying that she is
> above average for a successful politician at the national level.
> If all that's true, why is her approval level among the lowest in history
> for a nominee (aside from Trump)? I'd say that she's faced an unprecedented
> level of media bias. Her actions regarding Whitewater, Benghazi, the email
> server, and the Clinton Foundation have all faced extreme scrutiny, and
> while she clearly acted wrongly in some ways, at the end of the day there
> are more "troubling questions" than troubling answers. I think that the
> average politician has done much worse.
> How is any of this relevant to voting theory? I think that Mike is
> suggesting that there should be some kind of absolute cutoff for "honest
> approval". And I see the allure of that attitude. But I think that it's
> clear that there are plausible sets of candidates among which a progressive
> voter would be strategically well-advised to approve Hillary. (And I can
> easily imagine corresponding scenarios where a conservative or libertarian
> voter should strategically approve of someone they find unpalatable.)
> I have more to say on this, but I'll continue quoting Mike for a bit first:
>> Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
>> Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 important
>> categories (top-set & bottom-set).
>> Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your
>> Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
>> Based in the above, it _is_ possible to objectively say what the best
>> method is. It's Approval.
>> Yes, people want to vote not only _for_ their top-set--they want to also
>> vote _among_ their top-set.
>> In other words, they want it all.
> Yes! Of course they want it all! And I think that a system like U/P can
> give it all! Your best top-set is "preferred", your broader operational
> top-set is "acceptable", and others are "unacceptable".
>> That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the
>> probability of electing from your bottom-set.
> I have no idea what the logic is here. There is no sense in which U/P is
> more likely to elect a voter's bottom-set than approval.
>> I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and
>> MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind
>> offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
> I agree that MAM is good.
>> 3 Bucklin versions:
>> 1. Plain Bucklin:
>> No equal-ranking or skipping.
>> 2. B or A:
>> You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
> Why would you consider either of these better than something like U/P or
>> 3. ER Bucklin:
>> Equal ranking allowed. No skipping. ...except that if you equal-rank n
>> candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 rounds
>> before giving votes at your next rank.
> I don't entirely understand what you mean by "automatically skips n-1
> rounds", except that it seems that this makes the system more ranked than
> I'd say that any graded Bucklin method that uses strictly-above-median
> tallies as a tiebreaker — such as, in the simplest-to-describe case, U/P —
> is better than any of the three above.
> Not that the above aren't better than many methods. But I wouldn't call
> them best.
>> MJ advocates obfuscate it & its strategy, for themselves, by their
>> non-Bucklin wording of it.
> I have sympathy for this criticism, which is why I'm now pushing U/P over
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