Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Thu Sep 1 18:05:23 PDT 2016

To me, this appears workable. Am I missing something?:

Do MAM, using Kevin's definition of "beat" (the one that his ICA method


Ranking one's entire approval-set at top would give maximum protection to
those candidates, & would always be  optimal if your goal is to elect from
your approval set.

People seem to want a rank
method.  ...& will want to rank in sincere order.

With MAM, as with any MMC complying method, if your approval-set (or at
least part of it) has a majority preferring them to the other candidates,
and your goal is to elect from your approval-set, then you can safely rank
them sincerely.

But otherwise,  if you want to elect from your approval-set, then you'd
better approval vote them, top-rank them all, & have that

Hence the desirability of IC MAM.

I like the Bucklin version that doesn't allow equal-ranking or skipping in
rankings,  but allows the option of top ranking as many candidates as you
want, and not using any other rank-position.

...if you opt to do that instead of voting a ranking.

With that method too, you'd better approval vote, if some of your approval
set isn't preferred to all others by a majority.

IC MAM brings to MAM what equal top ranking does in Bucklin.

Michael Ossipoff
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