[EM] NEO almost surely meets FBC.
email9648742 at gmail.com
Sat Oct 29 18:06:16 PDT 2016
How could it not?
In Approval, you always approve your favorite, or your equal-favorites.
...in any situation, including the various Nash equilibria.
So top-ranking an additional candidate can't hurt your other, previously,
There are very few methods that meet FBC, Weak CD, and have wv strategy.
They an be counted on the toes of one of a cow's feet.
NEO works fine in the simplified examples that we all use for demonstrating
method-properties. I don't know of any particular reason why it wouildn't
work in a large national election. ...but, because it's such an unfamiliar
kind of count, I can't say for sure that it's implementable in a large
Maybe the NEO(combo) version has a better chance of large-election
implementability than NEO(cohort) does.
The only advantage that I'm aware of that NEO has over MMPO is that NEO
doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example.
That bad-example, though answerable, would have to be disclosed and
answered in an MMPO proposal. That greatly complicates and lengthens an
MMPO proposal. And, as I was saying, reform-opponents tend to haver much
more access to media, meaning that reform-advocates might not be able to
afford to reach many people with the answer to the bad-example criticism.
But MMPO's count-rule is a lot more briefly and simply stated:
The winner is the candidate over whom fewest people have ranked someone
(...some same other candidate)
Also, even if NEO is implementable in large elections, it would still be a
little problematic. For one thing, I guess it isn't precinct-summable.
So, most likely MMPO's drawback is outweighed by those of NEO, even if NEO
is implementable in large elections.
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