[EM] NEO almost surely meets FBC.

[Michael Ossipoff]

How could it not?

In Approval, you always approve your favorite, or your equal-favorites.
...in any situation, including the various Nash equilibria.

So top-ranking an additional candidate can't hurt your other, previously,
top-ranked canidates.

There are very few methods that meet FBC, Weak CD, and have wv strategy.
They an be counted on the toes of one of a cow's feet.

1. MMPO
2. NEO

NEO works fine in the simplified examples that we all use for demonstrating
method-properties. I don't know of any particular reason why it wouildn't
work in a large national election.  ...but, because it's such an unfamiliar
kind of count, I can't say for sure that it's implementable in a large
election.

Maybe the NEO(combo) version has a better chance of large-election
implementability than NEO(cohort) does.

The only advantage that I'm aware of that NEO has over MMPO is that NEO
doesn't have Kevin's MMPO bad-example.

That bad-example, though answerable, would have to be disclosed and
answered in an MMPO proposal. That greatly complicates and lengthens an
MMPO proposal. And, as I was saying, reform-opponents tend to haver much
more access to media, meaning that reform-advocates might not be able to
afford to reach many people with the answer to the bad-example criticism.

But MMPO's count-rule is a lot more briefly and simply stated:

The winner is the candidate over whom fewest people have ranked someone
else.

(...some same other candidate)

Also, even if NEO is implementable in large elections, it would still be a
little problematic. For one thing, I guess it isn't precinct-summable.

So, most likely MMPO's drawback is outweighed by those of NEO, even if NEO
is implementable in large elections.

Michael Ossipoff
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