[EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval voting

Mon Oct 17 07:10:02 PDT 2016

(Replying farther down)

On Oct 16, 2016 6:34 PM, "Jameson Quinn" <jameson.quinn at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> 2016-10-16 16:29 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>:
>>
>> Robert--
>>
>> 1. First, Burlington has special importance, as a city that showed
interest in a better voting system, and then experienced IRV's inadequacy.
>>
>> So, Burlington is a place where, more than anywhere else, proposal of
genuinely good methods is particularly promising and called-for.
>>
>> So, is there an already-existing
>> Organization or committee that is discussing voting system proposals for
Burlington?
>>
>> How would one contact them?
>>
>> 2. All here agree that IRV isn't what you want. It's been shown that all
of the better methods we're discussing would have elected the Democratic,
the apparent CWs.
>> Therefore it isn't necessary to rule any of them out yet.
>>
>> Approval, Score & Bucklin are simple, solid, and they all have
use-precedence. Approval in medieval Venice for a long time, Score in
Sparta, Approval again in electing the U.N. secretary-general,  & Bucklin
in at least 39 cities during the Progressive Era.
>>
>> And I doubt that those are their only precedence instances.
>
(You wrote) :

> You're missing Approval's use in Greece from 1860-1917, and Bucklin's use
(at Condorcet's posthumous suggestion) in pre-Napoleonic Geneva.

Thanks--I didn't know about those. Most likely, the first reforms would
have to be methods with use-precedent.

New methods probably would have to wait until people are used to not using
Plurality.

>
> Robert is looking for a method with a low cognitive burden.

(endquote)

But, as a participant at CES, you know that improvements on Approval &
Score are usually slight, difficult, or illusory.

Approval needn't be complicated to use or explain.

Approve your top-set.

In our official elections, for progressives, there certainly is a top-set.

The difference between progressive vs Republocrat candidates is obvious,
stark, drastic & dramatic.

Honest, humane & in tune  with the changes that people want, vs corrupt,
obviously dishonest & bought.

That lineup makes Approval pretty easy.

A 3rd category, conservative populists, seem to oppose corruption, but
offfer nothing different from the status quo.

If there weren't a top-set, people could just use an  approval cutoff at
the merit-midrange of the candidates, not counting the unwinnable
undesirables.

The merit-mean is too dependent on the numbers of candidates in the various
categories, & its false assumption that they have equal win-probabillty.

(You wrote) :

MAS is the answer. It's based on Bucklin, but simplified as much as
possible. Simple voting heuristics would give strategically optimal ballots
in most scenarios.

(endquote)

What incentive is there to not just approval-vote, given a top-set?

Bucklin's MMC gives some such incentive, if you're pretty sure you're
majority-favored.

But 3-slot methods fail MMC.

Approval-voting maximizes Pt, Probability of electing from top-set.

3-Slot ICT is offered as an Approval version.

Michael Ossipoff

It's expressive enough to distinguish a favorite from an acceptable
compromise from an unacceptable candidate: the main messages that any voter
should be able to send.
>
> As a stepping-stone to MAS, approval is the first step. Unambiguously
better than plurality, it gets most of the benefit with literally no extra
complexity. Yes, it has some cognitive burden; but, as spoiled ballots and
scenarios like Burlington show, actually less than IRV.
>
> Jameson
>>
>> Approval or Score was used for electing the Pope for quite a while.
>>
>> Any Condorcet method has more complexity, & no use-precedence. Even if
you prefer Condorcet, why not first get  _some_ good method, some
improvement.
>>
>> Approval doesn't even need any new balloting equipment or count software.
>>
>> Expense of changing to Approval: Zero.
>>
>> Something completely new, more controversial & complicated could be
proposed later.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>> .
>>
>> On Oct 15, 2016 11:49 AM, "robert bristow-johnson" <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval voting
>>> From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> Date: Sat, October 15, 2016 2:32 pm
>>> To: "Jeff O'Neill" <jeff.oneill at opavote.com>
>>> election-methods at electorama.com
>>>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> > Jeff:
>>> >
>>> > My reply was mostly to your justification of your lesser-evil voting.
>>> >
>>> > As for IRV, it can be said more simply:
>>> >
>>> > IRV was repealed in Burlington because it violated majority wishes.
The
>>> > Democrat it eliminated was someone who was majority-preferred to
everyone
>>> > else.
>>> >
>>> > A majority consisting of Democrats & Republicans wanted the Democrat
>>> > instead of the Progressive.
>>> >
>>> > That's what the Republicans thought that they were ensuring when they
>>> > ranked the Democrat in 2nd place:
>>> >
>>>
>>> which essentially punished the GOP Prog-haters for voting sincerely.
 despite the (false) promise that they could vote for their favorite
candidate without fear of helping elect their least favorite candidate.
>>>
>>> ...
>>> >
>>> > No voting-system can guarantee that the CWs will always win.
>>>
>>> well, if there **is** a CW, any Condorcet method will guarantee that
the CW wins.
>>>
>>> all of this differentiation between sincere CW and just CW is really
too difficult because we cannot open people's cranium and peer inside to
see what their sincere vote is.  i think the only reasonable assumption is
that, with sufficient *credible* assurance (that tactical voting will not
help their political interest any more than sincere voting) that all
ballots are sincerely marked.
>>>
>>>
>>> > But the better methods, like Approval, Score & Bucklin, gjve hir a
better
>>> > chance than IRV did in Burlington.
>>>
>>> of course, a Condorcet method will do better than any of those.  why
bother with something non-Condorcet if the target is electing the CW?  i
don't get it.
>>>
>>> and direct comparisons cannot be made.  Approval collects too little
data compared to a Ranked Ballot and Score forces the voter to concoct and
yield too much data.  it can only be compared if the ballot format is the
same.  so different RCV methods can be direct compared.  but comparing
methods with different ballots requires assumptions to be made.
>>>
>>>
>>> > IRV gave the win elsewhere in a way that the people in Burlington
rightly
>>> > perceived as arbitrary.
>>>
>>> not "arbitrary" but incorrect.
>>>
>>>
>>> > For one thing, Approval, Score, & Bucklin allow the CWs's preferrers a
>>> > better chance to protect hir win, to not give it away.
>>>
>>> and Ranked Pairs of Schulze allow an even better chance.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
>>>
>>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
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>
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