[EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval voting

[Michael Ossipoff]

I claim that rankings aren't important or necessary.

That's why my favorite methods are 3-Slot ICT (to be voted like Approval),
Approval & Score.

But it would be tremendously helpful for a method to avoid the
Chicken-Dilemma.

But, in this country's official state & national elections, rankings might
be psychologically necessary:

1. We have some seriously overcompromising cowardly lesser-of-2-evils
voter's (like the ones who are going to vote for Hillary).

Maybe , with a rank method, some of them would be willing to rank Favorite
over Sleaze-Compromize.

But, for the most dedicated overcompromiser, it's important to also allow
hir to fully help & protect both Favorite & Compromise, when voting both at
top.

Hence the need for FBC under current conditions.

2. Often, parties whose policy-proposals are very similar have tremendous
rivalry and mutually inimical feelings.

Those voters might be reluctant to approve eachother's candidates.

But they might be willing to rank a close & similar rival just below their
favorite.

Methods that have what all of the above kinds of voters need:

1.Bucklin versions that allow equal top ranking.

...such as ER Bucklin, and Bucklin(B or A), as I've defined them.

2. Plain MMPO, which, additionally, meets Weak CD.

Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 11, 2016 11:35 AM, "Ralph Suter" <RLSuter at aol.com> wrote:

> I agree with everything Jameson says except for one point in his ps. I
> don't think it's important that voters know exactly how votes are tallied
> to decide the winner as long as they understand the basic idea that in
> Condorcet voting, the winning candidate is the one who outranks every other
> candidate in one to one comparisons. Furthermore, figuring out how votes
> are tallied in IRV voting is not especially easy either for most voters,
> despite the arguments about it's simplicity that IRV supporters often make,
> which I have never found terribly persuasive.
>
> One other point I'd like to make is that in some voting situations, such
> as voting in informal meetings for options that most participants aren't
> terribly passionate about (e.g., "where and when shall we meet again"),
> approval voting is often vastly preferable to any ranked choice method and
> has a much lower cognitive burden. That's why I believe we need to discuss
> the relative merits of different voting methods not just for the purpose of
> elections for public office but for all kinds of voting situations.
>
> It may also be (and probably is) that some methods are better for some
> kinds of public elections than for other kinds. For example, approval may
> be preferable to any ranked choice method in many if not most elections for
> city council, while ranked choice may be preferable to approval for the
> U.S. presidential election.
>
> -Ralph Suter
>
> On 10/11/2016 1:02 PM, election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
> wrote:
> > ps. You mention Condorcet, and argue that the strategic cognitive burden
> is
> > higher than IRV. I disagree; but since Condorcet comes with a higher
> > cognitive burden in just figuring out why a given candidate won, I agree
> > that Condorcet methods are probably not best for large-scale elections.
>
>
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