fsimmons at pcc.edu
Sun Oct 2 16:26:18 PDT 2016
You have a good memory.
Zero to ten might be enough resolution for this technique to work for
typical levels of information.
Here's another criterion idea for use with Score style ballots:
We could say that candidate X strongly covers candidate Y iff X pairwise
beats every candidate that Y beats including the virtual candidates (if
any) that Y beats.
In particular, if Y beats a certain score level by having its median score
higher than that level, then so should X.
On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 3:16 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> Yes, avoiding the Plurality criticism could be worth requiring 1/8 of the
> A voters to truncate B.
> There could be an agreement between A & B voters, to rank eachother's
> candidate with 7/8 probability.
> "Flip a coin 4 times. If it comes down the same way every time, then don't
> rank them."
> That reminds me of the Srategic-Fractional-Support anti-defection
> strategy-suggestion that you made some time ago, & which I've been
> It's for methods without built-in chicken-dilemma protection, such as
> In one version, faction A could try to probabilistically give faction B
> just enough votes to make B win if the B faction is bigger than the A
> faction believes itself to be.
> Sure, it's a guess, but the A faction's guess is as good as the B
> faction's guess. They both have access to the same predictive information.
> So the fact that the A faction is trying that should deter defection by
> the B faction.
> It, too, could be done probabilistically, but it's one reason why I like 0
> to 99 or 0 to 999 Score voting.
> Also, in Approval, amicable factions could probabilistically give
> eachother's candidate some near-unity fraction of an approval. They're
> effectively fully helping eachother, but the bigger faction will
> automatically outpoll the other.
> Michael Ossipoff
> On Oct 1, 2016 12:09 PM, "Forest Simmons" <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
> > Here's an idea for fixing MMPO's lack of Plurality compliabnce:
> > Include the opposition of the Implicit Approval Cutoff Candidate, the
> virtual candidate on the truncation boundary.
> > Example:
> > 40 A
> > 10 C>A
> > 10 C>B
> > 40 B
> > In regular MMPO, the max opposition to C is 40. But when the number of
> ballots on which C is truncated is counted among the oppositions, the max
> opposition becomes 80. Thus Plurality is rescued.
> > How about the Chicken problem?
> > Consider
> > 49 C
> > 3 A (sincere A>B)
> > 24 A>B
> > 24 B (sincere B>A)
> > Regular MMPO gives A the win contrary to Plurality.
> > Taking the truncation opposition into account we have max oppositions
> for A, B, and C, respectively, as 73, 52, and 51. Candidate C wins,
> punishing B's defection. This only required three of the A supporters to
> truncate B.
> > Unfortunately, even this new version of MMPO fails Condorcet Loser and
> Clone Winner.
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
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