[EM] Trying to have CD, protect strong top-set, and protect middle candidates too

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Nov 22 16:29:29 PST 2016


Hi Chris,

      De : C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au>
 À : Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> 
Cc : EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>; Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
 Envoyé le : Mardi 22 novembre 2016 10h51
 Objet : Re: [EM] Trying to have CD, protect strong top-set, and protect middle candidates too
   
 On 11/22/2016 9:25 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
 
>>With MDDTR, if your plump for X makes hir lose, it's because you added a ballot. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the fact that the new ballot plumped for X.
>>Your ballot made X lose in spite of the fact that it was a plump for X, not because it was a plump for X.
>>But in IRV, when you make X lose by raising hir from last place to 1st place, that raising of X was the only thing that you did, and it is the reason why X lost. >
>That "distinction" is meaningless and completely useless.  The idea that adding a ballot is "something you did" that rates a mention is ridiculous.
I'm not sure about this specific example but I think this kind of distinction could be a useful defense. For IRV I might argue that a mono-raise failure happens not just from raising the winner but also lowering some other, incidental candidate. The reason mono-raise failures are offensive is that supposedly the voter has done nothing but aid the preexisting winner. But at least in IRV it is not so clear as that.
 
 
 
>Regarding MDDA,  symmetrically completing the ballots only at the bottom and having a moveable approval cutoff fixes its failures of Mono-add-Plump
>and Plurality and Irrelevant Ballots Independence and in my opinion makes it a good/acceptable method.
Hmm, with a movable cutoff MDDA already violates Plurality with three candidates. Do you think symmetric-completion of the bottom can save it?
For whatever interest it may be, I calculated the "DNA" for the method you describe and got the exact same 343-digit code as for ICA(explicit). That's the first time I've hit a method I already had...
 
 Chris Benham

   
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