[EM] Trying to have CD, protect strong top-set, and protect middle candidates too

[Michael Ossipoff]

I meant to ask: Did you say that MTRI doesn't pass FBC? How does FBC
failure happen? In return for FBC, it should beat MDDTR at vulnerability to
burial, and not be vulnerable to truncation.

Anyway, anything you can tell me about the properties comparison between
MTRI & MDDTR would be helpful.

MIchael Ossipoff

On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 5:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> For this method, MTRI, the procedural definition is more understandable
> than the recursive definition (though the recursive definition's brevity
> could be useful).
>
> So this is what I understand MTRI's procedural definition to be:
>
> 1. Order the candidates by their top-count score, with higher scores at
> top.
>
> 2. Switch the lowest pair of adjacent candidates whose lower candidate
> pair-beats the higher one.
>
> Repeat till there are no more pairs to switch. The highest candidate in
> the order at that time wins.
>
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> As a CD rank method, this method is a competitor of MDDTR. What are the
> property differences between MTRI & MDDTR?
>
> In particular, how does MTRI compare with MDDTR in regards to protection
> of a CWs against truncation & burial?
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 2:55 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Michael Ossipoff <
>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> But wouldn't Smith//Approval, with approval cutoffs in the rankings,
>>> share MDDTR's burial-vullnerability?
>>>
>>> ...with, additionally, vulnerability to truncation, which MDDTR
>>> _doesn't_ have?
>>>
>>> And Smith//Approval trades MDDTR's FBC for Smith, which I consider an
>>> unfavorable trade.
>>>
>>
>> Perhaps make truncation the default approval cutoff, but let voters move
>> it higher as an option:
>>
>> 45 C
>> 30 A>B or A>>B
>> 25 B
>>
>> Voting A>>B would be the chicken defense (where sincere is 25 B>A).
>>
>> Voting A>B would be the truncation defense (where sincere is 45 C>B).
>>
>> With this option, MDDA would be an FBC compliant method that is
>> truncation and burial resistant as well as quasi CD compliant.
>>
>> Is there a way to modify MDDA to make it satisfy mono-add-plump?
>>
>> How about incorporating some form of power truncation.  When you plump X
>> and reduce the majority victory of Y over Z to a sub-majority, it would
>> revert to a majority if you counted the common truncation of Y and Z
>> against each other as even half a point.
>>
>> Btw, in case you didn't see it, one of my new favorite non-FBC methods is
>> Most Approved Immune(MAI):  Elect the most approved immune candidate.
>>
>> This means elect the most approved candidate X that is unbeaten pairwise
>> by the candidate that would win (recursively) if the method were applied to
>> the same ballot set with X disqualified or withdrawn.
>>
>> It is the simplest approval based rank method that confers immunity from
>> second place complaints on its winners.
>>
>> It is quasi CD compliant if voters can specify their approval cutoffs
>> above the truncation level when they want to.
>>
>> A top rank version of this method is fully CD compliant:
>>
>> Elect the Most Top Ranked Immune candidate. (MTRI)
>>
>> In other words elect the most top ranked candidate X that is unbeaten
>> pairwise by the candidate that would win (recursively) if the method were
>> applied to the same ballot set with X disqualified or withdrawn.
>>
>> Forest
>>
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20161117/0a536a78/attachment.htm>