[EM] Trying to have CD, protect strong top-set, and protect middle candidates too

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Thu Nov 17 11:55:25 PST 2016


On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> But wouldn't Smith//Approval, with approval cutoffs in the rankings, share
> MDDTR's burial-vullnerability?
>
> ...with, additionally, vulnerability to truncation, which MDDTR _doesn't_
> have?
>
> And Smith//Approval trades MDDTR's FBC for Smith, which I consider an
> unfavorable trade.
>

Perhaps make truncation the default approval cutoff, but let voters move it
higher as an option:

45 C
30 A>B or A>>B
25 B

Voting A>>B would be the chicken defense (where sincere is 25 B>A).

Voting A>B would be the truncation defense (where sincere is 45 C>B).

With this option, MDDA would be an FBC compliant method that is truncation
and burial resistant as well as quasi CD compliant.

Is there a way to modify MDDA to make it satisfy mono-add-plump?

How about incorporating some form of power truncation.  When you plump X
and reduce the majority victory of Y over Z to a sub-majority, it would
revert to a majority if you counted the common truncation of Y and Z
against each other as even half a point.

Btw, in case you didn't see it, one of my new favorite non-FBC methods is
Most Approved Immune(MAI):  Elect the most approved immune candidate.

This means elect the most approved candidate X that is unbeaten pairwise by
the candidate that would win (recursively) if the method were applied to
the same ballot set with X disqualified or withdrawn.

It is the simplest approval based rank method that confers immunity from
second place complaints on its winners.

It is quasi CD compliant if voters can specify their approval cutoffs above
the truncation level when they want to.

A top rank version of this method is fully CD compliant:

Elect the Most Top Ranked Immune candidate. (MTRI)

In other words elect the most top ranked candidate X that is unbeaten
pairwise by the candidate that would win (recursively) if the method were
applied to the same ballot set with X disqualified or withdrawn.

Forest
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