[EM] Symmetric ICT reformulation and exploration
Forest Simmons
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Mon Nov 14 15:52:06 PST 2016
On Sun, Nov 13, 2016 at 10:18 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:
> The elimination-version of CTV--Wouldn't that have the same problem as
> IRV?
>
> Then, as you suggested, only the negotiated CTV would avoid that.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
Yes, if sincere preferences are
40 C>B
35 A>B
25 B>A
the CWs would lose under the IRV like transfer rules.
Under negotitiations the equilibrium solution would be for candidate A to
transfer her votes to B.
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