[EM] FBC, center squeeze, and CD

[C.Benham]

On 11/10/2016 1:16 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> You speculate that A was the CWs in the example.
>
> If A was the CWs, then plumping by even 100% of the A voters wouldn't 
> have foiled the burial by the B voters.

Mike,

Thanks for pointing that out!

46: A
44: B>C  (sincere is B>A)
10: C

100 ballots.  C>A 54-46,   A>B 46-44,   B>C 44-10. Top Ratings:  A46 > 
B44 > C 10.    Approvals: C54 > A46 > B44.

A is the sincere CW.  MDDTR elects B.

> With wv-like strategy, truncation from one side can't take victory 
> from the CWs & give it to the truncators' candidate.
>
> ...and plumping by the CWs's voters makes it impossible for burial to 
> succeed.
>


 From this we see that MDDTR /doesn't/ have "wv-like strategy".   A is 
the sincere CW and all of  A's supporters plumped for A,
but nonetheless the Buriers' favourite, B, won.  Winning Votes would 
have elected C.

Also we see that MDDTR  fails the Plurality criterion.   (The scenario 
looks like an old Margins bad-example that a WV advocate
might have given).

So to sum up,  MDDTR  doesn't have "wv-like strategy", but does fail  
Mono-add-Plump and Plurality and has a strong random-fill
incentive.

I vastly prefer 3-slot TTR,TR  (aka ICT).

Chris Benham



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