<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div dir="ltr">On 11/10/2016 1:16 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div
class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">You
speculate that A was the CWs in the example. <br>
<br>
</div>
If A was the CWs, then plumping by even 100% of the A voters
wouldn't have foiled the burial by the B voters.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Mike,<br>
<br>
Thanks for pointing that out!<br>
<br>
46: A<br>
44: B>C (sincere is B>A)<br>
10: C<br>
<br>
100 ballots. C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 44-10.
Top Ratings: A46 > B44 > C 10. Approvals: C54 > A46
> B44.<br>
<br>
A is the sincere CW. MDDTR elects B.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">With wv-like strategy, truncation from one side
can't take victory from the CWs & give it to the
truncators' candidate.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...and plumping by the CWs's voters makes it
impossible for burial to succeed.</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
From this we see that MDDTR <i>doesn't</i> have "wv-like
strategy". A is the sincere CW and all of A's supporters
plumped for A,<br>
but nonetheless the Buriers' favourite, B, won. Winning Votes
would have elected C.<br>
<br>
Also we see that MDDTR fails the Plurality criterion. (The
scenario looks like an old Margins bad-example that a WV advocate<br>
might have given).<br>
<br>
So to sum up, MDDTR doesn't have "wv-like strategy", but does
fail Mono-add-Plump and Plurality and has a strong random-fill<br>
incentive.<br>
<br>
I vastly prefer 3-slot TTR,TR (aka ICT). <br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>