[EM] FBC, center squeeze, and CD

[Michael Ossipoff]

Though I'd prefer being able to rank all of the inbetweens  with respect to
eachother, to protect the better ones from the worse ones, all across their
range of merit..

Sure, 3-slot MDDTR would be fine.

I'd rate all the inbetweens at middle. I'd be giving them full protection
from my bottom-rated candidates. And their voters could fully protect them
from burial by plumping.

Of course everyone's protection from truncation would still be automatic.

The only difference is that I wouldn't be able to distinguish among the
inbetweens, but that wouldn't be so bad.

So 3-slot MDDTR would be fine with me.

The difference from 3-Slot ICT? wv-protection for everyone.

Michael Ossipoff

On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 11:46 AM, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> On 11/8/2016 8:14 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't discussed it
> for a while.
>
> Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it?
>
>
> I think you did.  There was a  3-slot MDDA:
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Defeat_Disqualification_Approval
>
> MDDTR:
>
> Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to.
>
>
> I surprised you aren't proposing that it use 3-slot rating ballots.
>
> The method obviously has a horrible strong random-fill incentive.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
> I should re-state the definition of MDDTR, because we haven't discussed it
> for a while.
>
> Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who introduced it?
>
> MDDTR stands for Majority Defeat Disqualification, Top Ratings.
>
> MDDTR:
>
> Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to.
>
> Equal rankings allowed.
>
> 1. Disqualify any candidate who has a majority pairwise defeat, unless
> everyone has one.
>
> 2. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate top-ranked by the most
> voters.
>
> [end of definition]
>
> MDDTR meets FBC & CD, an has wv-like stratgy.
>
> The cost for that is that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump. I've discussed what
> that is no worse than IRV's failure of Mono-Raise. If IRV can be popular in
> spite of Mono-Raise failure, and its favorite-burial need, then MDDTR's
> Mono-Add-Plump failure shouldn't have its importance & badness exaggerated.
>
> IRV is popular here. Then there's no reason why MDDTR couldn't or
> shouldn't be at least as popular.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Chris--
>>
>> You suggested that Mono-Add-Plump failure is worse than Mono-Raise
>> failure because people care more about their favorites, and because
>> Mono-Raise failure is simpler.
>>
>> 1. Caring about favorites:
>>
>> a) So you're saying that Mono-Raise failure can't happen when someone
>> sincerely moves their favorite to top?:
>>
>> IRV:
>>
>> 31: A
>> 2: B>A (sincere is A)
>> 29: B>C
>> 30: C>A
>>
>> 1st round totals:
>>
>> A = 31
>> B = 29 + 2 = 31
>> C = 30
>>
>> C is eliminated & transferss to A
>>
>> Now A has a 61 majority and wins.
>>
>> But then the 2 B>A voters decide to sincerely raise A to top:
>>
>> 33: A
>> 29: B
>> 30: C
>>
>> B gets eliminated, and transfers to C.
>>
>> Now C has a 59 majority and wins.
>>
>> b) You care about favorite? What about when you need to rank Comprmise
>> over favorite to keep worst from winning? We're all familiar with that. In
>> Burlington, the Republicans didn't do that, and their failure to
>> favorite-bury elected their last choice.
>>
>> Yes, this isn't a monotonicity failure, but you used caring about
>> Favorite as an advantage of IRV's Mono-Raise failure over MDDTR's
>> Mono-Add-Plump failure. But obviously IRV has a bigger problem for
>> Favorite. ...the reason why IRV was repealed in Burlington.
>>
>> So please, let's not use caring about Favorite as a reason to prefer IRV
>> with its Mono-Raise failure
>> & its favorite-burial need, to MDDTR's Mono-Add Plump failure.
>>
>> 2. Simplicity:
>>
>> What could be simpler than your need, in IRV, to bury your favorite to
>> help Compromise beat Worst:
>>
>> Sincere:
>>
>> 40: C
>> 25: B>C
>> 35: A>B
>>
>> A voters vote sincerely, and B, the CWv, gets eliminated & transfers to
>> C. C wins because the A voters didn't favorite-bury.
>>
>> Strategic:
>>
>> 40: C
>> 25: B>C
>> 35: B>A (sincere is A>B)
>>
>> Now B wins.
>>
>> That's as simple as it gets. Let's not say that MDDTR's look-bad
>> criterion-failurle is simpler than IRV's serious favorite-burial need.
>>
>> Yes, I'm talking about a problem that isn't a monotonicity problem. But
>> its at least as simple as MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump problem, and is worse
>> because it's a practical strategy problem that makes people need to
>> favorite-bury.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>> By sincerely raising A to top, you made A lose.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 2:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>
>>>> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot,
>>>> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you
>>>> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the
>>>> effect would have been exacsly the same."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Someone" could *say* that, but it wouldn't make any sense.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But how so?
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I
>>>> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more
>>>> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing.  If the
>>>> method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like (such as IRV
>>>> and Benham), I would say:
>>>>
>>>> "Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every
>>>> desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually
>>>> incompatible), and this method economises
>>>> by not meeting mono-raise.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones, a method
>>> provides, the more of a cost there is, in terms of "embarrassment
>>> criteria", "could-look-bad".
>>>
>>> So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the
>>> "could-look-bad", and whether that could-look-bad could be bad in a
>>> practical way. As you suggested, MMPO's "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad
>>> news, and, as you suggested, is more than a "look-bad".
>>>
>>> But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV is only a
>>> could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never stopped me from saying good
>>> thins about those methods.
>>>
>>> Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails Mono-Add-Plump.
>>>
>>> MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy.
>>>
>>> ...the same advantages that MMPO has.
>>>
>>> ...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump.
>>>
>>> You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here love IRV. I don't
>>> reject those methods, though they aren't my main proposals, because of FBC,
>>> and the fact that there's nothing the CWs's voters can do to protects hir
>>> from losing, and the fact that Benham & Woodall are pairwise-count methods
>>> very vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive strategy, and innocent,
>>> nonstrategic truncation.
>>>
>>> If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the CWs is
>>> disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it might not be known who
>>> the CWs is, and s/he might not defenseiveliy plump, and so s/he (& you too)
>>> lose anyway, even though it isn't IRV. I don't know that the Bucklin
>>> failure that I just described will be rarer than the IRV failure that I
>>> just described. And IRV brings some big advantages for people who are
>>> majority-favored...MMC, CD, LNHa, LNHe.
>>>
>>> If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW, then s/he's big
>>> enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and that CW's voters would know
>>> something about hir, and would be unlikely to reject hir & transfer the
>>> other way when s/he's close enough to what you want that you'd prefer to
>>> elect hir.
>>>
>>> So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a proposal.
>>>
>>> Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and its Mono-Raise
>>> failure doesn't seem to hurt its popularity. You like IRV, and its
>>> Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off from it. I agree with you on that.
>>>
>>> And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be put off by MDDTR's
>>> Mono-Add-Plump failure.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But generally speaking people care most about their favourites
>>>>
>>>
>>> True.
>>>
>>>
>>>> , and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top. It's
>>>> true that after the election
>>>> some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we hadn't
>>>> top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely to be noticed and
>>>> of course isn't
>>>> true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters.  So the X
>>>> supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed and
>>>> coordinated we could have
>>>> used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and
>>>> elected X."
>>>>
>>>> But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that
>>>> "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy.
>>>>
>>>
>>> ...as with MDDTR.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be
>>>> confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example, neither
>>>> should it be
>>>> confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario.
>>>>
>>>
>>> ...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by ranking them
>>> higher?
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances)  are
>>>> incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump?
>>>>
>>>
>>> FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require failing
>>> Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem.
>>>
>>> With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is Mono-Add-Plump.
>>> That's a very small price, arguably less than IRV's Mono-Raise failure
>>> (though I note that you mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is about a favorite).
>>>
>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to
>>>> reluctantly give up Conditional Bucklin.
>>>>
>>>> But it would have been strategically great!
>>>>
>>>> Now, here's a question on a related topic:
>>>>
>>>> Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. I
>>>> show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to
>>>> lose?
>>>>
>>>> If so, why?
>>>>
>>>> It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former.
>>>>
>>>> I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a
>>>> ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X.
>>>>
>>>> If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for
>>>> X, that made X lose??!"
>>>>
>>>> ...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot,
>>>> thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you
>>>> voted for X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the
>>>> effect would have been exacsly the same."
>>>>
>>>> But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X lost when I
>>>> raised hir in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more
>>>> favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm doing.
>>>>
>>>> So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump.
>>>>
>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> The example I just posted of  "IBIFA with an anti-defection device"
>>>>> failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested
>>>>> "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom".
>>>>>
>>>>> 20: F=C >>B
>>>>> 07: F > C=B   (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >>
>>>>> C=B)
>>>>> 25: B
>>>>> 48: W
>>>>>
>>>>> All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters
>>>>> change their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom
>>>>> then the winner changes to B.
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
> No virus found in this message.
> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
> Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13366 - Release Date: 11/07/16
>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20161108/51c78742/attachment-0001.htm>