[EM] XA

[Monkey Puzzle]

Thanks for the feedback on mono-add-plump.

Thinking about the problem yesterday, I think that XA/CA/ATDT satisfies the
same kind of Weak Participation Criterion as Majority Judgment:

If candidate A wins under XA with a score of R, adding a ballot supporting
A with score >= R and all other candidates with scores < R will not cause A
to lose.

By definition of XA, no candidate with a score of R minus epsilon can get a
higher score if a ballot with a score of R - epsilon or lower is added to
to the total, because the new ballot's score caps the total.

The middle-score example posted by Jameson last week could not occur under
this restriction, I believe.

 Frango ut patefaciam -- I break so that I may reveal

On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 12:58 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:

> Good suggestions for public names; I prefer Capped Approval to Qualified
> Approval, since the word "qualify" is a loaded word in the context of
> elections.  Remember when HRC and Bernie Sanders were saying that their
> opponents were not qualified for the presidency?
>
> I'm sure that XA (or CA) satisfies mono-add-plump, since a plump ballot
> for X cannot reduce the XA score for X, nor can it improve the XA score of
> any other candidate.
>
> On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 12:49 PM, Monkey Puzzle <
> araucaria.araucana at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> If I may suggest another name for XA, you could call it Capped Approval,
>> for the following reason.
>>
>> A voter *caps* the highest rate at which they are willing to approve
>> candidate X.  By rating the candidate at R%, they express that they are
>> willing to contribute a vote to X *only *if less than R% of the
>> electorate is willing to support X at a rate greater than R.  So that
>> candidates rating, if it includes the R-voter's ballot, is capped at R.
>>
>> If there are greater than R% of voters who support X at a rate greater
>> than R%, the R-voter's ballot contributes nothing.
>>
>> As an alternative, you could call it Qualified Approval.  QA has the
>> alternate interpretation of Quality Assurance.
>>
>> I would be very happy with a method of this type if it could be shown to
>> satisfy at least a weak form of Participation, and Independence from
>> Irrelevant Alternatives.
>>
>>  Frango ut patefaciam -- I break so that I may reveal
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 9:13 PM, Andy Jennings <
>> elections at jenningsstory.com> wrote:
>>
>>> In this graphical framework, you can also think of XA as finding the
>>> largest square that fits between the distribution function and the x axis.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:00 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> For each candidate, you indicate on your XA ballot what you consider to
>>>> be an appropriate rating of merit or support on a scale of zero to 100
>>>> percent
>>>>
>>>> In the XA count, your ballot gives full approval to the candidates that
>>>> you consider under-rated by the rest of the voters, and no approval to the
>>>> candidates that you consider over-rated by the rest of the voters.
>>>>
>>>> The candidate with the highest (average or total) approval in the XA
>>>> count is elected.
>>>>
>>>> Any suggestions for improvement?
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Sounds like a good explanation to me.
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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